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“[L]awyers have expended much paper and ink learnedly struggling
to discover some elegant and hitherto obscure common denominator
among the courts’ products. Like medieval theologians, they avoid
confrontation with their system’s fatal paradoxes by immersing their
1
thoughts in trivial comparisons and nice distinctions.”
“The notion that the right to vote and other manifestations of citizenship might reflect defeat for a group rather than victory is not one
that many of us are likely to immediately realize, but it is one that
2
American Indian history forces us all to consider.”
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the 1760s and 1770s, British Parliament passed laws requiring
American colonists to pay taxes on everything from playing cards to
3
newspapers to tea. Parliament also required the colonists to house
4
the British soldiers sent to enforce these taxes. The vast majority of
colonists neither consented to nor had a hand in drafting these laws,

1. RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN
TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY xii (1980).
2. AMERICAN INDIANS AND U.S. POLITICS: A COMPANION READER 49 (John M.
Meyer ed. 2002).
3. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 91–96 (1944).
4. See id. at 96.
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and these laws only applied to American colonists. No one in
Parliament, or anywhere else in the British Empire, shared the
burden of these laws. The situation eventually led the colonists to
reject British authority, to the cry of “[n]o taxation without represen5
tation . . . [!]”
6
One hundred and seventy years later, two citizens of the MohaveApache Tribe faced similar political exclusion but sought a different
result —incorporation into the opposing sovereign instead of
7
separation from it. Frank Harrison and Harry Austin both lived on
the Fort McDowell Reservation. Harrison had risked his life in the
U.S. military during World War II. Both paid taxes to the State of
Arizona and the federal government. Shortly after the war, Harrison
and Austin went to the Maricopa County Recorder’s office to register
to vote. The County Recorder refused to register them, stating that
they were wards of the federal government and therefore lacked the
requisite competency. Harrison and Austin responded by suing to
enforce their right to vote, resulting in Harrison v. Laveen, the seminal
8
case affirming the right of reservation citizens to vote in state
9
elections.
10
Similar decisions followed, but for many years, most tribal citi11
zens did not vote in non-tribal elections. Some did not vote because
anti-tribal interests went to great lengths to discourage or prohibit

5. Id. at 97.
6. Many people, tribal and non-tribal, use the term “member” to refer to
individuals formally enrolled in a tribe as part of the tribe’s body politic. Members of
a sovereign body politic are more accurately referred to as “citizens,” at least in a
democratic context. Because vocabulary influences perception, and the use of the
term “member” marginalizes the sovereign aspect of tribes, this paper will use the
term “tribal citizen.” Cf. infra note 8.
7. See Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456, 457–58 (Ariz. 1948) (holding that
Indians have the right to vote in Arizona elections for state and federal officers).
8. For purposes of this article, “reservation citizens” are reservation residents
who are also citizens of, i.e. “enrolled in,” the tribe that governs the reservation on
which they live. “Tribal citizens” are individuals who are formally enrolled in a tribal
government but might live on or off their tribe’s reservation. “Non-citizen Indians”
are individuals who live on a reservation other than the reservation of the tribe in
which they are enrolled (for instance, a Navaho citizen who lives on the Rosebud
Sioux Reservation). Cf. supra note 6.
9. Harrison, 196 P.2d at 463.
10. Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975); Prince v. Bd.
of Educ. of Cent. Consol. Indep. Sch. No. 22, 543 P.2d 1176 (1975); Montoya v.
Bolack, 372 P.2d 387 (1962); cf. Acosta v. San Diego County, 272 P.2d 92 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1954).
11. See infra notes 12–14. “Non-tribal elections” refers to national, state, and
non-tribal local elections collectively.
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voting by tribal citizens. Others felt voting in state and federal
elections inappropriate because they did not view themselves as
13
citizens of either sovereign.
Things have changed, however. Since the return of tribal veter14
ans from World War II, the Civil Rights Era’s campaign against race15
based distinctions, the advent of successful tribal gaming enterpris12. See DANIEL MCCOOL ET AL., NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 10–20 (2007) (discussing strategies by states to
prevent or limit Indian voting); Danna R. Jackson, Eighty Years of Indian Voting: A Call
to Protect Indian Voting Rights, 65 MONT. L. REV. 269, 275–81 (2004) (discussing the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 which prohibits any individual action or law denying or
abridging voting rights on account of race or color); Jeanette Wolfley, Jim Crow,
Indian Style: The Disenfranchisement of Native Americans, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 167, 167–
92 (1991) (discussing various techniques used to exclude Indians from voting).
13. See Robert B. Porter-Odawi, Two Kinds of Indians, Two Kinds of Indian Nation
Sovereignty: A Surreply to Professor Lavelle, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 629, 643 (2002)
[hereinafter Porter, Two Kinds of Indians] (“[W]hy so many Senecas do not vote in the
White Man’s elections was because we take pretty seriously the fact that we have our
own nation, our own elections, and our own sovereignty.”); Robert B. Porter, The
Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act
of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107,
128 (1999) [hereinafter Porter, The Demise] (“‘This was a violation of our sovereignty.
Our Citizenship was in our own nations. . . . There was no great rush among my
people to go out and vote in the white man’s elections.’”) (quoting Tuscarora Chief
Clinton Rickard in Laurence Hauptman, Congress and the American Indian, in EXILED IN
THE LAND OF THE FREE 3263 (Oren Lyons & John Mohawk eds., 1991); David Wilkins,
An Inquiry into Indigenous Political Participation: Implications for Tribal Sovereignty, 9 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 732, 734 (2000) (“Part of the reason for the reluctance or refusal of
political scientists to examine indigenous political participation rests on the fact that
politically tribal nations, generally—although this is changing for some tribes—do
not consider themselves to be part of the pluralistic mosaic that is predominant in
political science literature. Tribes perceive of themselves not only as preconstitutional entities, but more importantly, as extra-constitutional polities.”); see also
THEODORE W. TAYLOR, THE STATES AND THEIR INDIAN CITIZENS 91 n.30A (1972) (citing
Letter from Edward C. Hinckley, former Commissioner of Indian Affairs for Maine, to
Thomas Tureen (March 24, 1972)) (“Some Maine Indians publicly opposed the
removal of the constitutional exception and the granting of the right to vote because
they saw it ‘as a step to[]wards the termination of the special Indian-State relationship.’”) (quoting Letter from Edward C. Hinckley, former Commissioner of Indian
Affairs for Maine, to Thomas Tureen (Mar. 24, 1972)).
14. See MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 9–10 (“Indian veterans, returning home
after service in World War II, played a pivotal role in fighting for the right to vote.”);
U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 32–40 (1947) (noting that many
barriers to right of citizenship and its privileges, including voting, were removed after
World War II).
15. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, FIRST PEOPLES: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF AMERICAN
INDIAN HISTORY 459–60 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the organization of the American
Indian Movement in the summer of 1968); JOANE NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN ETHNIC
RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY AND CULTURE 95, 130–37,
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16

es, and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s imposition of state
17
compacting requirements, tribes and tribal citizens have become
18
more and more involved in local, state, and national politics. Today,
tribes and tribal citizens vote, donate, lobby, and serve in elected
19
office more than ever. Tribal leaders formed the National Congress
of American Indians (NCAI) in 1944 in order to encourage such
participation—at the national level at first, but later pushing state
20
involvement. Political parties and candidates have increased the
time and attention paid to tribal populations as races tighten in
21
battleground states. As of July 2009, the National Caucus of Native
American State Legislators listed thirty enrolled tribal citizens serving

158–84 (1996) (discussing the Civil Rights Era’s influence on the increase in
individuals identifying as Native American and the Red Power movement); John P.
LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in American Politics:
A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 533, 535-51 (2001)) (criticizing
Professor Porter’s view of the Red Power Movement and arguing its positive effects on
Indian rights); Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 143–46 (noting the positive effects
of the Red Power movement and the American Indian Movement).
16. James Dao, Indians’ New Money Buys Lobbying Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998,
at B1, (“Indians, of course, have been coming to Washington for as long as it has
existed, to talk over treaty rights and other issues. And since the early 1990’s at least,
tribes have been using newfound gambling wealth to expand their political muscle.”);
Wilkins, supra note 13, at 732 (“[S]ince the late 1980s, and largely as a result of Indian
gaming, there now exists a situation where some tribal governments, acting, they
argue, in a sovereign capacity, are not only proactively supporting state and federal
office seekers (in addition to tribal office seekers) by making significant financial
contributions to American political campaigns (in addition to their own tribal
campaigns), but are also weighing in on issues—like the national tobacco litigation —that seem unrelated to tribal affairs . . . . [G]ambling wealth is providing some
tribes with opportunities to employ skilled lobbyists, savvy public relations firms, and
make large campaign contributions . . . in a manner heretofore unknown.”).
17. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (hereinafter “IGRA”) requires tribes to
enter an agreement with the surrounding state (a “compact”) before beginning
gaming activities. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2006). See also Porter, The Demise, supra
note 13, at 150–51 (“One of the main reasons for this increase in political activity
appears to be the need to safeguard gaming rights, a phenomenon that has emerged
in the last ten years to make a few select Indian nations extremely wealthy and
allowed many more to generate modest income to support tribal government
operations.”) (citing Tim Johnson, The Dealer’s Edge: Gaming in the Path of Native
America, 12 NATIVE AMERICAS, 16 (1995)).
18. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
20. THOMAS W. COWGER, THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS: THE
FOUNDING YEARS 9, 44, 64–65 (1999).
21. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 176–83; National Congress of American
Indians’ 2008 Native Vote Campaign, The American Indian Vote: A Brief History &
Current Obstacles, http://nativevote.org/images/docs/ (follow “The American
Indian Vote: A Brief History 2004 pdf” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
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22

as elected state officials. Many represent districts that coincide with
23
reservation territory.
Some scholars have sternly attacked tribal citizen participation in
state and federal politics, asserting that such participation undermines
24
tribal sovereignty. Others have staunchly defended such participation, welcoming the benefits participation has brought and asserting
those benefits as proof that the best way to defend tribal interests is
25
through such participation.
In a recent press release, NCAI
President Joe A. Garcia said, “[i]ncreasing civic participation among
American Indian and Alaska Native communities is imperative to
protecting sovereignty and ensuring Native issues are addressed on
26
every level of government.”
Through it all, tribes and tribal citizens have asserted—with varying levels of success —that the non-tribal laws they participate in
making do not, or should not, apply to reservation territory or
residents. As a consequence of this paradigm, reservation citizens
who participate in state politics end up imposing laws and duties on
citizens of the surrounding state—laws and duties which reservation
citizens generally have no obligation to obey or subsidize. In this way,
tribes and tribal citizens living on reservations assume the same
position as British Parliament of the 1760s vis-à-vis American Colonists. A position more diametrically opposed to basic American
political principles—contrary to the basic shared American parable—
could not exist. Participation by reservation residents appears unfair
when viewed in light of universally-accepted American political
27
concepts, a point still routinely asserted by opponents of tribal
22. List from Linda Murakami Sikkema, Director, National Caucus of State
Legislators, State-Tribal Institute, to Michael D. Oeser (July 7, 2009; on file with
author); National Caucus of Native American State Legislators, http://www.native
americanlegislators.org/Public%20Documents/Caucus%20Membership.aspx (last
visited Nov. 3, 2009) (copy on file with author). This figure excludes representatives
from Alaska and Hawaii. Adding these states, the total rises to 35.
23. Survey done by Cate Kellett and Melissa Holds the Enemy at the Great Lakes
Indian Law Center in June, July, and August 2009 (on file with author).
24. Porter, Two Kinds of Indians, supra note 13, at 635–36, 639, 647–49; Porter,
The Demise, supra note 13, at 169–70, 173–74.
25. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 194; see generally LaVelle, supra note 15
(arguing that the most appropriate means to assert tribal interests is to actively
participate in state and federal politics).
26. Press Release, Nat’l Congress of Am. Indians, NCAI Rolls Out 2008 Native
Vote Initiative at Annual Convention in Denver (Nov. 12, 2007).
27. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT 579
(Comm. Print 1977) (“Reservation Indians would be citizens of the State but be
wholly free of State law and State taxation even though they participate in the
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28

sovereignty.
This article focuses on the relationship between participation by
reservation citizens in state and federal politics, and sovereign
authority over reservation lands and residents. The article points out
similarities between the theoretical tensions faced by the Founders
relating to multiple sovereignties, and the dilemma faced by tribes
today. This article identifies accelerating trends in the area of tribal
political participation and analyzes them in light of four fundamental
American political principals: (1) legitimate government derives its
authority from the consent of the governed, (2) participation in a
democratic political process constitutes consent to be governed by
that process, (3) human beings inherently seek power as a result of
self-interest, and (4) one sovereign will succumb to another where the
two compete to exert authority over the same people, territory, or
both. This article looks to the debates leading up to the ratification of
the present U.S. Constitution for guidance on these principles. This
approach provides a common political and ethical framework that
most Americans understand and accept —a useful platform from
which to advocate for tribal sovereignty to non-tribal audiences,
including legislatures and courts.
This article ultimately asserts that, like the inhabitants of ancient
Troy dragging a wooden horse inside the gates, reservation citizens
are embracing the demise of tribal governments if they continue to
participate in federal and state elections without taking steps to avoid

creation of State law and State taxing schemes. In short, reservation Indians would
have all the benefits of citizenship and none of its burdens. On the other hand, nonIndian citizens of the State would have no say in the creation of Indian law and policy
on the reservation, even if they were residents of the reservation, and yet be subject to
tribal jurisdiction. In short, non-Indians would have all the burdens of citizenship but
none of the benefits.”); TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 91 (“Historically there were
practical problems with Indians voting in State elections. Indians living on a Federal
reservation were frequently not subject to State or local laws while on the reservation.
If they voted for State and county officials they participated in making laws or levying
taxes not applicable to them but applicable to others. This situation is still true and it
raises bothersome questions of equity from the non-Indian point of view.”).
28. Cindy Yurth, Diné Racist, Anglo says, NAVAJO TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A1,
available at http://www.navajotimes.com/news/2009/0409/041609racism.php; Cindy
Yurth, Navajos Take Over Apache County Government, NAVAJO TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A4,
available at http://www.navajotimes.com/news/2008/1108/110608apacheco.php; cf.
Martin Reed, Candidates’ Opinions Vary on Tribal Boundary Lawsuit, WIND RIVER NEWS,
Oct. 16, 2008, at 13; Apache County Board of Supervisors Issues Minutes of Oct. 16 Special
Meeting, U.S. State News, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://www.navajocountyaz.gov/
bos/minutes/2007/101607Min.pdf; (discussing that after election, in Apache County,
“Navajos will hold a majority of elected offices”).
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the sovereign conflict that results. No one can deny that tribes and
their citizens have had greater success in non-tribal politics in recent
years, becoming better able to influence legislation and policy
29
targeting tribes. However, by participating in non-tribal political
processes, tribes and tribal citizens consent to state and federal
jurisdiction over reservation lands and residents. Such participation
legitimizes present assertions of sovereignty within reservations, invites
further assertions, undermines tribes’ ability to advocate against the
exercise of non-tribal jurisdiction over reservation territory, and
exacerbates the three-way conflict between tribal, state, and federal
sovereignty. Tribes have generally lost ground in this three-way
conflict over time, suffering a piecemeal erosion of sovereignty similar
to what The Founders thought would happen to the states absent
clear, affirmative limitation of federal authority. This pattern suggests
that multiple-sovereignty problems are responsible for tribes’
sovereign losses and that addressing these problems may slow or halt
those losses. If tribes continue down the present path, competition
between the three sovereigns will ultimately hollow out tribal
sovereignty, implicitly or explicitly. This article will show how
participation-based analysis has played an increasing role in U.S.
Supreme Court decisions reducing tribal sovereignty. Moreover, this
article will suggest that a slight shift in focus in this reasoning — from
how the denial of non-Indian participation in tribal politics limits
tribal authority, to how the pursuit of participation by tribal peoples
in non-tribal politics authorizes non-tribal authority—is a dangerous
logical extension of this legal progression.
Because the status quo will result in continued losses of tribal
sovereignty, tribes and tribal citizens must make a tough choice today
if they want any control over how these tensions resolve tomorrow:
active incorporation into non-tribal governments or active separation
from them. Furthermore, the incorporate-or-separate decision must
be made on two different levels —federal and state. Important
distinctions between the tribal-federal relationship and tribal-state
relationship suggest a different result in each instance.
Continued tribal participation at the federal level is likely in tribes’ best interest. Federal law-making with regard to tribes is unlikely
to abate. Because people governed by a particular political process
have a right—and a reason —to participate in that process, tribes
have a vested interest in participation in the federal law-making
29.

See infra Part II.C.
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process. However, the need for continued federal participation
makes establishing limits on federal authority imperative to avoiding
continued losses of tribal sovereignty. Fortunately, a successful model
for limitation of federal power readily presents itself —the Tenth
Amendment.
In contrast, tribal participation in state political processes seems
less imperative and less amenable to a stable limitation of power that
would leave tribes more autonomous than not. States generally have
not legislated over tribes, making tribal participation in state political
30
processes less necessary to protect tribal interests.
Moreover,
whereas a stable model for dual citizenship/authority already exists in
the tribal-federal context, the same cannot be said for a three-way,
tribal-state-federal division of citizenship/authority. Even if a stable,
consent-based model could be established, a three-way split could
easily result in tribes losing further sovereignty. This suggests the
absence of a middle ground where tribal, state, and federal citizenship
can meaningfully co-exist from a tribal perspective. In the absence of
a middle ground, tribes need to make a clear decision to incorporate
or separate.
Tribes choosing active incorporation could use the states’ desire
for dominion over tribal lands to affirmatively preserve some, but
probably not all, of the benefits tribes enjoy as separate sovereigns.
Tribes choosing to separate from the state would have to give up any
benefits realized through voting in non-tribal elections and service in
non-tribal office, but could stem the erosion of their sovereignty, and
possibly stabilize their relationship with surrounding states through
intergovernmental agreements.
While choosing incorporation or separation cannot involve an
ethical imperative if individual autonomy is to be respected, making
some choice very well may. Asserting the ability to participate without
being subjected to the products of that participation presents a
hypocritical position that Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court will
likely resolve to the detriment of tribes over time. Continued
participation creates reasons and opportunities for the federal
legislature and courts to further erode tribal sovereignty, some of
which may occur before tribes that choose to buttress their sovereignty through political separation can do so effectively.
30. Even in those states that have legislated over tribes via Public Law 280,
serious questions about the legitimacy of such legislation arise given that no tribe
consented to the exercise of state legislative power. See infra notes 129–32 and
accompanying text.
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Part II of this article will review the legal and historical development of reservation citizens’ right to participate in federal and state
politics. This review will provide perspective on the extent of tribal
political participation, and thus provide a basis for subsequent
analysis. The review will also give readers a basis for judging the costs
and benefits of ending such participation. Part II will then specifically
examine the cases establishing this right to vote, placing them in the
larger anti-tribal policy context from which they arose, and explaining
how they represented a lost opportunity to promote tribal sovereignty
by separating tribal and state authority in terms of both person
(citizenry) and place (territory). Part III will consider the foundations
of the four previously mentioned concepts of American political
thought and law. Part IV will evaluate the implications of various
types of participation by tribes, tribal citizens, and reservation citizens
in non-tribal political processes. Part IV will also point to evidence
suggesting that the type of piecemeal destruction of subordinate
sovereigns predicted by opponents of the 1789 Constitution is
happening to tribes today in the manner and at the pace predicted by
those opponents. Part IV will close by suggesting some alternative
courses of action for tribes should they chose to politically incorporate with states or separate from them.
II. KICKING THE TIRES ON THE WELCOME WAGON:
THE DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF TRIBAL VOTING AND
PARTICIPATION
Making an informed decision about whether or not to participate
in non-tribal politics requires perspective on each alternative. This
makes a brief review of the history of and benefits gained from
participation in non-tribal politics by tribes and tribal citizens. This
review will demonstrate the extent of tribal involvement in non-tribal
politics, a factor relevant to the later analysis. Additionally, this review
will provide the basis for determining appropriate remedial action
should a tribe choose to avoid the consequences of such participation.
A. Federal and State Citizenship: Becoming Part of the American Body
Politic
The Federal Constitution did not specifically define who was and
31
was not a citizen at first. Arguably it made oblique reference to some
31.

William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO.
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standard for citizenship when it described the qualifications for
32
various offices, and implied that citizenship was related to appor33
tionment and taxation. Whatever it did to define citizenship, it was
at least equally clear that Indians who maintained societal and
34
political ties with their tribes, i.e. those “not taxed,” were not citizens.
The Fourteenth Amendment introduced a broad, specific definition of citizenship, designed to eliminate racial distinctions with
35
regard to citizenship. However, to the surprise of many non-Indians
today, “tribal” Indians, i.e. those “not taxed,” did not fall within this
exception because the basis for excluding “tribal” Indians was not
racial; it was political. In Elk v. Wilkins, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that native people born into their respective tribes did not qualify as
36
citizens simply by “abandon[ing their] tribal relations,” and went
into great detail with regard to how separate tribes and their citizens
37
were from states and state citizens. Tribal citizens were not “subject
to the jurisdiction” of the United States. They did not pay the state or
federal taxes generally associated with citizenship, were not counted
in apportioning representation, generally were not subject to nontribal law, and had only been naturalized previously by specific treaties
38
or legislative acts. Consequently, tribal citizens could only become
federal and state citizens with the express consent of the United States
39
via established naturalization laws and processes, just like the vast
majority of other foreign nationals. Elk’s holding gave strong support
to tribal sovereignty by equating tribes with foreign governments, thus
IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 228–29 (2008).
32. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3
(Senators); U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 5 (President).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
34. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403–04 (1856), superseded by statute, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[Indian tribes] formed no part of the colonial communities, and never
amalgamated with them in social connections or in government. [T]hey
were . . . a free and independent people, associated together in nations or
tribes, and governed by their own laws. . . . These Indian Governments were
regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean
had separated the red man from the white . . . .
Id. at 403-04 (alteration in original).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment sought to
include all former slaves in an effort to combat slavery and its vestiges: “All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States . . . .”
36. 112 U.S. 94, 106 (1884) (alteration in original).
37. See id. at 99–109.
38. See id. at 102–07.
39. See id. at 109.
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reaffirming Americans’ historic understanding that tribal peoples
were neither federal nor state citizens. They were politically separate
40
in terms of both government and territory.
The United States naturalized many tribal citizens via treaties and
41
legislation prior to 1924. By 1924 only about a third of all tribal
42
people were not already U.S. citizens. The Citizenship Act of 1924
43
unilaterally imposed U.S. citizenship on all remaining tribal citizens,
in spite of the fact that Americans, from the time of the Revolution,
have espoused the idea that legitimate government requires the
44
consent of the governed. Some tribes and individual Indians actively
opposed the Act; these dissenters were nonetheless subject to the
45
draft and federal taxes. Opposition to dual federal-tribal citizenship

40. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (discussing hostilities between
Indian inhabitants and States), NO. 25 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the
separateness of Indian nations), NO. 42 (James Madison) (concerning dangers from
foreign force and influence); see also Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, ch. VIII, 1
Stat. 50, 52 (1789); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5. Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543 (1823); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 136 (2002) (citing VI REG. DEB.,CONGRESS, 1056, 1059 (1830)).
41. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1447 (providing for extension of
citizenship to the Indians in the Indian Territory); Act of Mar. 3, 1921, 41 Stat. 1249,
1249–50 (granting citizenship to members of the Osage Tribe); Act of Mar. 3, 1843, 5
Stat. 647 (naturalizing the Stockbridge tribe of Indians); Act of Nov. 6, 1919, 41 Stat.
350 (granting U.S. citizenship to Indians who served in the U.S. military during
World War I); Act of Aug. 9, 1888, 25 Stat. L. 392 (granting U.S. citizenship to Indian
women who married U.S. citizens); Treaty with the Cherokee art. 8, July 8, 1817, 7
Stat. 1256; Treaty with the Cherokee, art. 2, Feb. 27, 1819, 7 Stat. 195, 196; Treaty with
the Choctaw art. 14, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, 335; Treaty with the Ottawa art. 4,
June 24, 1862, 12 Stat. 1237, 1238; Treaty with the Seneca, Mixed Seneca, Shawnee,
Quapaw, etc. art. 13, 17, 28, Feb. 23, 1867, 15 Stat. L. 513.
42. McCOOL, supra note 12, at 7–8; LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 110
(1973); WILCOMB WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND/WHITE MAN’S LAW 164 (Univ. Okla.
Press, 2d ed. 1995); Gary C. Stein, The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 47 N.M. HIST.
REV. 257, 257 (1972).
43. See Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006)); Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 124. The
Nationality Act of 1940 attempted to clear up doubt created by the language of the
Act of 1924 as to the status of Indians born after the effective date of the prior Act.
See Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138 (1940) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000)).
44. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text.
45. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956) (holding that Indians are
subject to federal taxation “in the ordinary affairs of life”); Choteau v. Burnet, 283
U.S. 691, 696 (1931) (holding that federal income taxes apply to Indians absent a
treaty or statutory tax exemption); Totus v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 7, 12 (E. D.
Wash. 1941) (holding Tribal Indians to be subject to the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–303 (repealed 1956)); AMERICAN INDIANS AND
U.S. POLITICS, supra note 2; COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 676-84 (Nell
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continues today. Some dispute the constitutionality of the act.
Outside the reservation context, people who gain U.S. citizenship
48
simultaneously become citizens of the states in which they reside.
Federal and state case law assumes that reservations are part of the
states in which they exist and that therefore the same rule applies for
49
reservation residents, although reason to doubt that conclusion
50
exists.
Jessup Newton et al. eds. 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (§ 8.02 (2)(b) “Federal Taxes:
Federal Taxation of Tribes and Indians: Income, Estate, and Gift Taxation of
Indians).
46. See Chief Irving Powless, Jr., Speech to the University of Buffalo Law School
(Mar. 21, 1998), reprinted in The Haudenosaunee, Yesterday and Today, 46 BUFF. L. REV.
1081, 1083 (1998):
[The Iroquois Confederacy] have never accepted this law. We do not
consider ourselves as citizens of the United States. This law is a violation of
the treaties that we signed that prove that we are sovereign. Because we are
a sovereign people, the United States cannot make us citizens of their
nation against our will. . . . I have never voted in any election of the United
States, and I do not intend to vote in any coming elections. Most of our
people have never voted in your elections.
(alteration in original). See also Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 126–28, 159–60.
47. See Clinton, supra note 40, at 246–52; Kenneth W. Johnson, Sovereignty,
Citizenship And the Indian, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 973, 992 (1973); Porter, The Demise, supra
note 13, at 135–39.
48. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside.”) (emphasis added).
49. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2001); Org. Vill. of Kake v. Egan,
369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962); Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1885);
Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 458, 458 (Ariz. 1948); Acosta v. San Diego County, 126
Cal. App. 2d 455, 463, 467; (1954); Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387, 393–94 (N.M.
1962).
50. For instance, the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement that
reservations constitute part of the surrounding state rests on strikingly flawed
precedent. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361–62. The Hicks Court ultimately based its
assertion on a Department of Interior (“DOI”) publication, Org. Vill. of Kake v. Egan,
and Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher. Id. However, the DOI publication and Kake both rely
on Utah & N. Ry. Co. Org. Vill. of Kake, 369 U.S. at 72; U.S. Dept. of Interior, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 510 n.1 (1958). Utah & N. Ry. Co. involved state taxation of a railroad
line situated on a tract of land through an Idaho reservation. 116 U.S. at 28-29. The
opinion seems to weave between three alternative arguments to find a way to validate
the tax. Id. at 31–33. First, the Court ignores treaty language setting aside the
reservation for the tribe’s “absolute and undisturbed use,” excluding all but
“authorized” government agents, and requiring the consent of a majority of the adult
males to cede further lands. Id. at 30. The Court brushes the treaty aside because
prohibiting the tax was not “necessary” for the tribe to “enjoy the full benefit of the
stipulations for their protection.” Id. at 31–32. This reasoning is facially inconsistent
with “absolute and undisturbed use” and seems to condescendingly say the tribe will
just not know the difference. Next, the Court argues that the tribe ceded the tract
where the rail line sat, thus subjecting it to state jurisdiction. Id. at 31–33. Assuming
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B. Crashing Through Initial Roadblocks to Participation
Attaining federal and state citizenship gave tribal citizens the
right to vote in federal and state elections, although the vast majority
did not do so at first, mainly for two reasons. Many did not vote
because anti-tribal interests went to great lengths to exclude tribal
people from voting, often using tactics similar to those used to
51
disenfranchise African Americans. At the same time, some tribal
people felt that tribal citizenship, federal citizenship, and state
52
citizenship were mutually exclusive. Both sides acknowledged vast
cultural differences and generally lived in separate communities. The
53
states had always been adversaries of the tribes. Consequently, to
vote in non-tribal elections would be meddling in the affairs of others,
or worse, collaborating with the enemy.
Once Indians became citizens, non-tribal opponents of tribal
voting rights in state elections commonly used four legal arguments to
keep tribal people from voting:
(1) Indians were under federal guardianship, or were federal
“wards,” and therefore not independent and competent [to
the tribe ceded the land, the case ceases to stand for a reservation being part of the
state. Last, the Court asserts that the building of the rail line inside the reservation
alone somehow gave the state the right to tax it. Id. at 32–33. This again conflicts
with the treaty language, and with common understandings of territorial jurisdiction.
No one thought Idaho suddenly gained the right to tax Utah or Montana lands just
because the Utah & Northern Railway Co. ran its tracks there.
51. See MCCOOL, supra note 12, at 10–19; Wolfley, supra note 12, at 181–92
(describing various justifications and tactics used by the states to deny Indians the
right to vote); see generally United States Department of Justice, Introduction to
Federal Voting Rights Laws, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro_a.htm
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing tactics used to disenfranchise African
Americans).
52. See supra note 13, and accompanying text; Doug George-Kanentiio, Why
Iroquois will not Vote, NEWS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Nov. 15, 1996, at 14A (“According
to Iroquois law, [Iroquois citizens] are expressly prohibited from participating in the
political process of an alien nation.”); Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power,
and the American Indian, 1870 to 1992, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE 317, 326
(1992) (quoting Tuscarora Chief Clinton Rickard) (“The Citizenship Act did pass in
1924 despite our strong opposition. By its provisions all Indians were automatically
made United States citizens whether they wanted to be so or not. This was a violation
of our sovereignty. Our citizenship was in our own nations. We had a great
attachment to our style of government. We wished to remain treaty Indians and
reserve our ancient rights. There was no great rush among my people to go out and
vote in the white man’s elections. Anyone who did so was denied the privilege of becoming a
chief or a clan mother in our nation.”) (emphasis added)).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“Because of the
local ill feeling, the people of the states where [Indian tribes] are found are often
their deadliest enemies.”).
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vote];
(2) Indians living on reservation lands were residents of their
reservation and not of the state . . . [and therefore failed to
meet residency requirements];
(3) Indians [living on reservations were not subject to state law,]
did not pay state taxes and, therefore, should not be able to
affect revenue decisions; and
(4) Indians were not “civilized,” and their continued participation in their [t]ribal communities precluded participation in
54
other elections.
Proponents of tribal voting successfully challenged these restric55
tions in a series of state court cases, clearing the first major hurdle
toward increased tribal participation in non-tribal political processes
at the local, state, and national levels. Later, tribes also fought
successfully to place precincts on reservation lands, have translators
available at polling places, and prevent gerrymandering to marginal56
ize tribal populations. Recognizing that tribal participation in tribal
elections was consistently higher than tribal participation in non-tribal
57
elections, some tribes moved their election dates to coincide with
54. Native Voters could Affect 2004 Elections, DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, Oct. 7,
2004, http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-new.cfm?doc_name=sr-108-2-283 (last
visited Nov. 12, 2009); see also COHEN, supra note 45, at 172 (describing the definition
of Indians as “wards”); MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 3–19; Willard Hughes
Rollings, Pursuing Equal Justice in the West: Citizenship and Suffrage: The Native American
Struggle for Civil Rights in the American West, 1830–1965, 5 NEV. L.J. 126, 135–39 (2004)
(discussing states’ arguments against Indians’ right to vote: Indians could not be
civilized enough, Indians lived on Indian reservations and therefore did not pay state
taxes, Indians were wards of the government and therefore not competent enough to
vote, and Indians were not residents of the state).
55. See, e.g., Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948) (holding that Indians
are not “under guardianship” as contemplated in Arizona Constitution and statutes,
and therefore cannot be excluded from voting); Acosta v. San Diego, 272 P.2d 92
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (rejecting the argument that a reservation Indian was not a
state resident and ordering the County to provide welfare benefits to plaintiff);
Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387 (N.M. 1962) (holding parts of the Navajo Reservation within the exterior boundaries of New Mexico were politically part of the state,
and therefore, reservation residents were state residents for voting purposes); Swift v.
Leach, 178 N.W. 437 (N.D. 1920) (holding trust-patent Indians who had become
civilized and severed their tribal relations were qualified to vote); see also MCCOOL ET
AL., supra note 12, at 48–67, 98–105, 119–129, 143–153.
56. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 69, 72–86; Jackson, supra note 12, at 269–
81; Rollings, supra note 54, at 139–40; Wolfley, supra note 12, at 195–201 (discussing
gerrymandering of Indians’ votes and denial of polling places in outlying Indian
communities as well as the Voting Rights Act which requires language assistance at
the polls).
57. See generally John M. Glionna, Finding a Voice in Politics, L.A. TIMES, May 22,
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non-tribal elections.
C. The Rise of Tribal Influence in Non-Tribal Politics
Three developments in the last seventy-five years stand out as the
most influential in the area of tribal participation in non-tribal
politics: (1) the creation of pan-tribal organizations focused on
promoting comprehensive political action, including voter engagement; (2) the rise of tribal gaming enterprises; and (3) more recently,
the position of tribal populations as “swing votes” in “battleground”
states. Together, these developments have led to an unprecedented
level of tribal political power in non-tribal politics.
The National Congress of American Indians came into existence
in 1944 with the goals of coordinating tribal opposition to federal
termination policies, securing native voting rights, and pressing for a
58
commission to hear native land claims. NCAI’s strategy included
educating the public and elected officials about tribal issues, lobbying,
litigating voting rights cases, monitoring elections, and encouraging
tribal citizen voting—essentially comprehensive political participation
59
in non-tribal politics. When termination policy was abandoned,
NCAI continued its effort to support tribal government and individual
rights. In recent years, NCAI’s efforts to encourage tribal voting have
60
been directed through its Native Vote Initiative and appear to have
61
experienced steady success.
Another younger organization has followed in NCAI’s footsteps,
but with a more focused mission. The Indigenous Democratic

2004, at A-1; Sarah Kershaw & Eli Sanders, The 2004 Campaign: Voting Blocs; Politicians
Go Courting on Indian Reservations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1 (discussing the
increased influence of Indians’ votes).
58. See
National
Congress
of
American
Indians,
History,
http://www.ncai.org/History.14.0.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (discussing the
NCAI’s founding in 1944 in order to respond to termination and assimilation policies
forced upon tribal governments); see also COWGER, supra note 20, at 3, 9–10, 44, 64–
65, 151–53.
59. COWGER, supra note 20, at 9–10, 44, 64–65, 151–54.
60. See generally National Congress of American Indian, Policy Issues,
http://www.ncai.org/Policy-Issues.6.0.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (providing a
list of policy matters addressed by the NCAI); Native Vote, http://nativevote.org/
index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (providing information on the National
Congress of American Indians’ 2008 Native Vote Campaign); see also MCCOOL ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 177–79.
61. See Jodi Rave, While Indians were Expected to go to the Polls..., BISMARCK TRIB.,
Dec. 3, 2008, at B1 (stating that preliminary numbers collected by NCAI suggest
strong general trend of increasing tribal voting).
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Network began in early 2005 and focuses on getting tribal candidates
elected to non-tribal positions, i.e. “local, state, and national”
positions. The INDN pursues its mission through recruiting potential
candidates, training them how to campaign, fundraising for them,
advising them during their campaigns, and encouraging voter turnout
62
on their behalf.
The seeds of influence sown by the NCAI and INDN took root in
the fertile earth provided by tribal gaming enterprises. Gaming
enterprises gave successful tribes the resources to fund candidates,
hire lobbyists, purchase issue-based advertising in prime-time slots,
63
and make donations that gave them access on both sides of the aisle.
This trend has continued and accelerated. A recent study conducted
by the Associated Press in 2003 showed that tribes contributed about
$7 million to federal candidates, political action committees, and
64
national parties in the 2001–2002 election cycle. According to the
Center for Responsive Politics, tribes donated more than $10 million
65
to federal candidates alone in the 2007–2008 election cycle. As
tribal gaming has grown, it has developed its own independent
economic force in some places; employing so many non-Indians, it
has become difficult to oppose without collateral economic damage to
66
tribal and non-tribal citizens alike. The federal government has
effectively made further tribal engagement in state political processes
a high priority for tribes with the passage of the Indian Gaming

62. See Indigenous Democratic Network, Our Mission, http://indnslist.org/
OurMission (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing the INDN’s four-pronged strategy
to elect Democratic Indians and involve Indians in the political process); Indigenous
Democratic Network List, Helping Indians Run, http://indnslist.org/HelpIndiansRun
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing INDN’s assistance which includes recruitment,
training, funding, and providing assistance throughout the campaign).
63. See MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 185–87; Dao, supra note 16 (discussing
the political power created by Indian’s gambling profits); Wilkins, supra note 13, at
732–33; (discussing the use of Indian gaming finances to make significant funding
contributions to American political campaigns).
64. See Tribes can give Candidates more Cash American Indian Tribes are Exempt from
the Overall Donor Limit in Federal Campaign Law, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 18, 2003, at A1
(describing American Indian tribes’ use of their advantage in political giving: they do
not have to abide by the overall individual donor limit).
65. See Center for Responsive Politics, Indian Gaming: Long-Term Contribution
Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?cycle=2008&ind=g6550
(last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
66. See, e.g., W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 88, 147, 160 (2000) (referring to economic benefits such as job creation
produced by casino operations as well as the conflict between Indian gaming interests
and non-Indian gaming interests).
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67

Regulatory Act and its compacting requirement.
With the seeds sown and the ground fertile, changes in the political climate have provided ripe conditions for those seeds to sprout.
Margins of victory between the two major parties appeared to narrow
68
from the 2000 election until the 2008 election. Given that tribal
69
populations generally strongly favor Democrats as a group, they can
70
tip elections, and while it might be hard to prove, they probably
have. In Native Vote: American Indians, the Voting Rights Act, and the
Right to Vote, the authors characterize this new group of participating
71
72
native peoples as a “swing-vote electorate,” and they are not alone.
Whatever the reality is, major parties have paid more attention to
tribal voting blocks in recent years than ever before based on that

67. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2008); Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught In
The Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal Influence over
Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 972, 1000 (2007) (discussing the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act and its affect on the states); see, e.g., MASON, supra note 66, at 59–69,
146–75 (examining legislative intent to set up a system in which state and Indian
tribes communicate and the Act’s application in New Mexico state court).
68. See generally MCCOOLET AL., supra note 12, at 176–77 (“Efforts to mobilize
Indian voters have been greatest in a few western swing states, where such voters can
make the difference between defeat or victory in certain races.”); Glionna, supra note
57; Kershaw & Sanders, supra note 57 (“In the last few years, political races from
Congress to county sheriff have begun to hinge on the Indian vote, particularly in
places like South Dakota, where the Indian population is 8 percent [sic]. Republicans and Democrats alike, including the presidential candidates, are courting Indians
as never before . . . .”).
69. Open Secrets, Indian Gaming: Long-Term Contribution Trends,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?cycle=2008&ind=g6550
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2009).
70. It is impossible to point to a particular vote that won a particular race, even
when the margin of victory is narrow.
71. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 176.
72. See, e.g., Anne T. Denogean, 60 Years Ago in Arizona, Indians Won Right to Vote,
TUCSON CITIZEN, July 24, 2008 (“American Indian clout in Arizona sometimes
manifests as the swing vote. An exceptional Indian turnout in 2002 helped put Janet
Napolitano into office as governor in a race decided by 11,819 votes.”); Denis
Staunton, Presidential Hopefuls on The Trail of Native American Vote, IRISH TIMES, May 31,
2008, at 9; (“Indians form 10 per cent of the population of New Mexico, a key swing
state . . . and they could make a difference to tight races in Colorado and Nevada—
and even California . . . .”); The Race is on for Congressional District 1: Norris; Navajos are
‘Sleeping Giant’, NAVAJO TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at A1; U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, Native
Americans Could Decide Race In Key States, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 3, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 21919854 (“Congressional District 1 is in northern Arizona . . . the district has
a 25 percent population of Native Americans . . . . [I]t’s a swing district.”); Jodi Rave,
The National Congress of American Indians Leading National “Election Protection” Measure,
BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 1, 2008, at B1 (“[T]he Native vote in some districts is as high as
20 percent, allowing for enough voters to determine the final results of an election.”).
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D. Tribes’ Political Harvest
Although it is difficult to establish clear causation when it comes
to elections and politics, the election of tribal citizens to non-tribal
political office represents strong evidence of the level of tribal
influence. Today, at least thirty tribal citizens have been elected to
74
state legislatures in the continental states, many of whom represent
districts that overlap with reservations.
The causal connection between tribal participation and nontribal election results stretches a bit thinner when the candidates in
question are non-tribal and the district in question is not made up
primarily of tribal voters. Nonetheless, many attribute the outcome of
some races featuring those candidates and districts to tribal interests.
For instance, tribal citizens make up only about two percent of
Washington State’s population; however, tribal votes and tribal
gaming revenues have been credited with providing important
financial support that resulted in the defeat of U.S. Senator Slade
Gordon in 2000, the 129-vote victory of Governor Christine Gregoire
75
in 2004, and the 2006 re-election of U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell. In
the 2002 South Dakota U.S. Senate race, Tim Johnson trailed
Republican challenger John Thune most of the night, but took the
lead when the last two precincts were counted—precincts that

73. Glionna, supra note 57; Daniel Lathrop, Native Americans Launch D.C.
Lobbying Campaign, THE HILL, July 15, 1998, at 9 (“The Democratic National
Committee has aggressively targeted American Indians in recent years and continues
to do so. The DNC has brought tribal leaders to Washington for political training,
formed an advisory committee on American Indian concerns and adopted an official
plank supporting tribal sovereignty.”); Rockin’ Out the Native Vote—’Rez Rock the Vote’
Airs on PBS, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, October 6, 2004 (“[B]oth Democrats and
Republicans are vying for the Native vote. President Bush met with tribal leaders and
veterans during the opening of the National Museum of the American Indian and
reaffirmed tribal sovereignty. The Democratic National Committee in Washington,
D.C. is now preparing American Indian field directors and hosting the first ever
Native American Field Training Program. . . . New Native American Field Directors
are being deployed to battleground states with significant Native American
populations including Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, Colorado, Nevada,
Oregon, Michigan, Wisconsin, Florida and Minnesota.”).
74. This figure excludes representatives from Alaska and Hawaii. Adding these
states, the total rises to 35. See supra note 22.
75. Amy Argetsinger, Judge Upholds Win For Wash. Governor, WASH. POST, June 7,
2005, at A04; Lynda V. Mapes, More Natives Step Into Legislature, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 9,
2007.
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76

covered most of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.
E. Missing Context

Many people, tribal and non-tribal, have celebrated the ability of
77
reservation citizens to vote in state, and thereby national, elections.
They have rejoiced in their ability to defeat anti-tribal legislation and
officials. Unfortunately, this joy overshadowed the fact that the right
of reservation citizens to vote in non-tribal elections started out as the
capstone of a federal policy designed to destroy tribal sovereignty.
1. The Means and Ends of the “Allotment and Assimilation”
and “Termination” Policies
The federal government’s “Indian” policy has, by and large, fo78
cused on “getting rid” of the “Indian problem.”
“Indians”
represented a “problem” for Americans primarily for four reasons.
79
First, they lived on land desired by non-tribal people. Settlers
80
wanted land for homesteads, farms, and ranches. Businesses wanted
to profit from the available natural resources, including gold, or the
81
right to lay train tracks through reservations. In the eyes of surrounding non-tribal communities, tribes failed to put the land to
good use in many instances, and therefore did not need it, or worse,

76. MICHAEL BARONE ET AL., THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1468 (2004).
77. Accord Arizona Natives to Celebrate Native American Right to Vote Day, REZNET, July
11, 2008, http://www.reznetnews.org/blogs/tribalog/arizona-natives-celebrate-nativeamerican-right-vote-day-16590# (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); Navaho Woman Awarded for
Contesting Prop. 200 Law, NATIVE AM. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at 2, available at 2008 WLNR
16422348.
78. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 404.
79. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 218–43, 290–316, 372–403; Merrill E. Gates,
Land and Law as Agents in Educating Indians, in SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BOARD OF INDIAN COMMISSIONERS 17–19, 26–35 (1885) and reprinted in AMERICANIZING
THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 1880–1900, at 47–48
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973) (“The great mass of our legislation regarding Indians
has had to do with getting land we had promised them into our possession by the
promise of a price as low as we could fix and yet keep them from making border
warfare upon us . . . .”).
80. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 218–43, 290–316, 372–403.
81. Id.; Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 114 (“Congress was under considerable pressure from two competing interests to resolve this question in favor of ending a
separatist approach. The railroads and other business interests were eager to
appropriate the remaining Indian lands to promote further Westward expansion.
These were extremely powerful forces that were offset and tempered only by the
intensity and commitment of the social reformers bent on ‘“helping’” the Indians
through the perpetuation of their Indian civilization efforts.”).
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were not worthy of it because they were guilty of the moral sin of
82
83
sloth. State governments viewed these lands as “lost” tax revenues
and areas of “lawlessness” interrupting their otherwise lawful domi84
nion, providing a safe haven for those seeking to evade state law.
Second, tribes were a problem because they could resist efforts to
take territory by force until at least the late 1800s. Tribes did not
always win open conflicts, but up to the turn of the nineteenth
century they could make military conflict financially, strategically, or
85
politically prohibitive. They could also tip the balance in conflicts
86
between other sovereign forces. The allegiance of tribal forces,
therefore, played a major role in American policy from the Revolution
87
through the Civil War for these reasons.
Third, tribes were a problem because by the time they lost the
ability to mount substantial armed resistance, sufficient numbers of
religious or otherwise humanitarian non-tribal groups were pushing
for “civilization” of the tribes, based on a moral obligation to honor
88
governmental agreements and a sense of “noblesse oblige.”
The
influence of these groups made open extermination not viable
89
politically, although some considered genocide a legitimate option.
82. 18 Cong. Rec. 190 (1886) (statement of Rep. Skinner); AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS, supra note 79, at 47–48 (“We have held [the Indians] at arm’s
length, cut them off from the teaching power of good example, and given them
rations and food to hold them in habits of abject laziness.”); CALLOWAY, supra note 15,
at 230 (stating that non-Indians rationalized taking Indian land because “Indians did
not put the land to good use . . . and could not be allowed to deny that land to
American farmers.”); Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 112–19.
83. See infra note 275.
84. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1405, 1409–15 (1997) (describing how
19th and 20th century impressions of Indian Country as “lawless” related to the
introduction and passage of Public Law 280).
85. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 162–80, 218–43, 290–316.
86. See generally id. (describing tribal involvement in American wars through the
nineteenth century).
87. See generally id.
88. See id. at 404–10; Gates, supra note 79, at 46–49 (arguing that considerations
of noblesse oblige should urge the United States to “save the Indian from himself”
through promotion of civilization, Christianity, and citizenship); Porter, The Demise,
supra note 13, at 114–15 (discussing the influence of the Indian Rights Association in
promoting efforts at civilization).
89. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 5 (“One approach was basically genocide,
replete with statements that all Indians should be exterminated forthwith, or, in
Senator Doolittle’s quaint phrase quoted earlier, ‘put . . . out of the way.’ Colonel
George Armstrong Custer clearly demonstrated this objective when he slaughtered a
Cheyenne village on the Washita River in 1868—the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. A Nebraska newspaper at that time editorialized: ‘Exterminate the
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Last, tribes were a problem because the material support provided to “Indians” by the federal government cost a great deal of
money for which the people providing that support thought they
90
received little or no benefit.
Consequently, any comprehensive solution to the “Indian problem” had to do four things: (1) siphon tribal land and resources out
of tribal control and into non-tribal hands; (2) not rely primarily on
the use of military force, which meant using diplomacy, law, or both;
(3) give jurisdiction over tribal lands to state governments; and (4)
relieve the federal government of its obligation of support and
supervision.
From 1871 to 1934, the federal government thought the answer
91
was “allotment and assimilation.” The main goal of this policy was
the “absor[ption of tribes] into the mainstream of American life,” and
92
Tribal
the destruction of “the ‘savagery’ of tribal autonomy.”
peoples were to “participate fully in the American system” to “end the
tribe as a separate political and cultural unit,” and to “have exactly the
93
same law appl[y] to [them] as applied to whites.” Part and parcel of
the assimilation end game was to confer U.S. citizenship on tribal
94
citizens.
Congress passed three main pieces of legislation to accomplish
95
this task—the 1887 General Allotment Act (GAA), the 1924 Indian
96
97
Citizenship Act, and the 1885 Major Crimes Act. The GAA aimed
to break up tribal territories. It gave the President discretion to divide
whole fraternity of redskins.’”); RENNARD STRICKLAND, THE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA 38
(H. Wayne Morgan et al. ed., Univ. of Okla. Press 1980) (quoting Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Hiram Price, “[O]ne of two things must eventually take place, to wit,
either civilization or extermination of the Indian.”).
90. See LORING BENSON PRIEST, UNCLE SAM’S STEPCHILDREN: THE REFORMATION OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1865–1887, AT 107–108 (Bison Book 1975) (1942)
(discussing Congress’s growing reluctance to provide annuities, seeing them only as
charity as excess tribal lands were absorbed by the government).
91. ROBERT CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 30–36 (LexisNexis, 5th ed. 2007); cf. COHEN, supra note 45, at 75–84
(describing the shortcomings of “Allotment and Assimilation 1871-1928”).
92. COHEN, supra note 45, at 77.
93. Id. at 77, 81.
94. Id. at 899 (“It became a major goal of the assimilation process to make
Indians citizens of the United States. This was especially true with the allotment
policy.”).
95. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (repealed 2000).
96. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1994)).
97. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §1153 (2006)).
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up any reservation he thought “advantageous for agricultural or
grazing purposes” into parcels of pre-determined size, called allot98
ments. Once selected, the reservation was surveyed and a census of
tribal citizens made. Tribal citizens then had the opportunity to select
99
allotments. Some tribal citizens did not select allotments; a federal
100
agent assigned allotments to these tribal citizens. If “surplus” lands
existed after all allotments were made, the federal government could
101
sell such land to settlers. Initially, the consent of the tribe whose
land was to be allotted had to be obtained before any “surplus” lands
102
could be sold; however, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lone
103
Wolf v. Hitchcock undid the consent requirement.
Allotted lands were generally held in trust for twenty-five years,
104
during which time they could not be alienated or encumbered. The
idea was that during the trust period tribal members would be
educated, Christianized, forced to adopt non-tribal culture, and
105
forced to abandon “heathen” culture. The trust period could be cut
short by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs if the allottee proved to
106
be sufficiently “competent” to manage his or her affairs, although
proof of competency usually bore more relation to rationalizing the
transfer of land out of Indian hands than genuinely giving Indians
107
control of their own affairs.
At the end of the trust period, the
allottee was granted a fee patent entitling the allottee to alienate the
land and making the land subject to state criminal and civil jurisdic108
tion, including property taxation. Upon receiving the fee patent,
109
the allottee also became a U.S. citizen.
110
The Indian Citizenship Act sought to break up tribal governments by compromising the foundation of all governments—their

98. See Beck v. Flournoy Live-Stock & Real-Estate Co., 65 F. 30, 33 (8th Cir. 1894)
(internal quotations omitted) (referring to section 1 of the Act of Feb. 8, 1887).
99. See id. (referring to section 2 of the Act of Feb. 8, 1887).
100. See id. (referring to section 3 of the Act of Feb. 8, 1887).
101. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006).
102. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (repealed 2000).
103. 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
104. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
105. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J., 1, 10–12 (1995).
106. Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182 (amending § 6 of the General Allotment Act)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349).
107. See Royster, supra note 105, at 10–12.
108. Burke Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 182.
109. Id.
110. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)).
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111

citizenry. Although the U.S. Supreme Court baldly stated that dual
tribal-federal citizenship under the GAA during the trust period was
112
not incompatible, it clearly stated that the GAA’s ultimate goal when
all land had been allotted and all trust periods expired was to dissolve
tribal governments, terminate the federal guardianship, and extend
113
state law over the allottees. The 1924 Citizenship Act unilaterally
admitted tribal citizens to U.S. citizenship regardless of whether they
114
consented to being citizens. The act declared that it “shall not in
any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal
115
or other property.” However, if expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
statute left open the possibility that such dual citizenship might
116
“impair or otherwise affect” other rights, including sovereign rights.
If there were no conflict with regard to dual citizenship, the language
regarding property should not have been necessary.
117
The Major Crimes Act undermined tribes by replacing tribal
law, processes, and authority with non-tribal ones in a primarily
118
governmental and culturally crucial area—criminal justice. The Act
extended federal jurisdiction and non-tribal concepts of criminal
justice over tribes and reservations land. The Act authorized the
federal enforcement of seven specific crimes committed against the
119
person or property of an “Indian or other person.”
The Act
represented the first extension of non-tribal jurisdiction over
120
exclusively tribal affairs.
Prior statutes and agreements only
governed offenses when non-tribal individuals or property were
121
involved. Other programs begun by the Indian Service during this
period also sought to destroy tribal culture and autonomy, including
Indian Police, the Courts of Indian Offenses, and Indian Boarding

111. Id. Many tribal citizens were granted U.S. citizenship by the GAA, earlier
agreements, and other legislation. See supra note 41. “Many [of these] efforts were
designed to make tribal memberships and United States citizenship mutually
exclusive.” COHEN, supra note 45, at 83.
112. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916).
113. See id. at 596–97.
114. See supra note 42.
115. Ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)).
116. Id.
117. Ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
118. The Act was a direct result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
119. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. at 385.
120. Royster, supra note 105, at 43–44.
121. Id. at 44.
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122

Schools.
123
After a brief period of affirmation of tribal governments, the
federal government pursued a new answer to the “Indian problem”
124
from 1943 to 1962 —a policy of “termination.” This policy period
had goals identical to those of the allotment and assimilation
125
period, but used a more accelerated time line and slightly different
means. Once again the ultimate goal was to “as rapidly as possible . . .
make the Indians . . . subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens [and]
to end their status as wards . . . and to grant them all of the rights and
126
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.” Another goal of
termination policy was for “all of the Indian tribes and the individual
members . . . [to] be freed from Federal supervision and control and
from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians” as
127
soon as possible, “end[ing] most aspects of the historic relationships
between the federal government and [any terminated] tribes,
128
transferring responsibility for those tribes to states.”
Legislation pursuing the termination policy mainly took two
forms —acts “terminating” specific tribes and acts extending state
jurisdiction over reservations. An act terminating a tribe would
129
generally set a deadline for termination of two to five years. During
that time, final rolls would be prepared and the tribal property would
130
be distributed. Ultimately, federal education, health, welfare, and
housing assistance ended, and state legislative and judicial jurisdiction
was imposed, including state taxation authority. Federal and tribal
131
laws no longer applied.
The federal government also extended state jurisdiction over

122. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 91, at 35–36.
123. COHEN, supra note 45, at 84–89 (generally referred to as “Indian Reorganization” policy period, roughly 1928-1942).
124. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 91, at 39–41; Cf. COHEN, supra note 45, at 89–97
(“Termination 1943-1961”).
125. COHEN, supra note 45, at 90 (“[This period] turned Native American policy
back onto itself, reflecting the practices and philosophy of the earlier era of allotment
and assimilation.”).
126. H.R. CON. RES. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953); COHEN, supra note 45,
at 94.
127. H.R. CON. RES. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
128. COHEN, supra note 45, at 94–95.
129. Id. at 95.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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132

reservations by means of Public Law 280.
This law unilaterally
transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction over almost all reservations
133
The law
within five states to the governments of those states.
envisioned similar transfers in each of the remaining states so long as
the voters of each state consented to assume it. “The alleged justification was a lawlessness that amounted to the complete breakdown of
law and order on Indian reservations because of the inadequacy of
134
tribal law enforcement and institutions.”
In 1968, Congress
required tribal consent to extend state jurisdiction under Public Law
280; however, nine additional states had already assumed full or
135
partial jurisdiction by that time.
2. Lining Up the Timeline: Federal Policy and Tribal Citizen Voting
in Non-Tribal Elections
Viewed in isolation, it comes as no surprise that conflicts over
Indian voting occurred during a policy period in which Congress
passed legislation conferring citizenship on large numbers of Indians.
However, when placed in a broader historical context, the connection
between these challenges and federal efforts to eliminate tribal
sovereignty become clearer. Numerous tribal citizens had been
136
granted federal citizenship prior to the GAA. Despite this, few cases,
132. Pub. L. No. 83-280, Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (section 7 repealed and
reenacted as amended 1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 1360 note); COHEN, supra note 45, at 96, 544–65.
133. Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin were the
original “mandatory” states. Pub. L. No. 83-280, Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). The
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon and the Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians Minnesota were specifically excluded from Public Law 280
jurisdiction. COHEN, supra note 45, at 96, 544–65.
134. COHEN, supra note 45, at 96.
135. Indian Civil Rights Act, 82 Stat. 78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C
§§ 1321–1326 (1968)); COHEN, supra note 45, at 96–97.
136. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884):
[Indians] were never deemed citizens of the United States, except under
explicit provisions of treaty or statute to that effect, either declaring a certain tribe, or such members of it as chose to remain behind on the removal
of the tribe westward, to be citizens, or authorizing individuals of particular
tribes to become citizens on application to a court of the United States for
naturalization, and satisfactory proof of fitness for civilized life; for examples
of which see treaties in 1817 and 1835 with the Cherokees, and in 1820,
1825, and 1830 with the Choctaws, 7 Stat. 159, 211, 236, 335, 483, 488;
Wilson v. Wall, 6 Wall. 83; Opinion of Attorney-General Taney, 2 Opinion of
Attorneys General 462; in 1855 with the Wyandotts, 10 St. 1159; Karrahoo v.
Adams, 1 Dillon 344, 346; Gray v. Coffman, 3 Dillon 393; Hicks v. Butrick, 3
Dillon 413; in 1861 and in March, 1866, with the Pottawatomies, 12 Stat.
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if any, involving state or territorial voting rights for reservation citizens
exist prior to the start of the Allotment and Assimilation Period in
1871. It was only when the federal government began pushing the
extension of citizenship and state political rights to tribal citizens as
part of its plan to eliminate tribes that these challenges began in
earnest and, more importantly, began to succeed.
Many states voluntarily amended their voter requirements during
the termination period to allow Indians to vote without the need for
137
litigation. Other states continued to resist the effort to extend state
political rights to tribal citizens, making court challenges necessary.
The major cases first successfully contesting the categorical exclusion
of reservation citizens from voting were all decided during either the
138
allotment and assimilation period (1871 to 1934), or the termina139
State ex rel. Crawford v. Norris
tion policy period (1943 to 1962).
140
141
(decided in 1893), Swift v. Leach (decided in 1920), Trujillo v.

1192; 14 Stat. 763; in 1862 with the Ottawas, 12 Stat. 1237; and the Kickapoos, 13 Stat. 624; and acts of Congress of March 3, 1839, ch. 83, § 7,
concerning the Brothertown Indians, and of March 3, 1843, ch. 101, § 7,
August 6, 1846, ch. 88, and March 3, 1865, ch. 127, § 4, concerning the
Stockbridge Indians, 5 Stat. 351, 647; 9 Stat. 55; 13 Stat. 562. See also treaties with the Stockbridge Indians in 1848 and 1856, 9 Stat. 955; 11 Stat. 667;
7 Opinions of Attorneys General, 746.
See also supra note 37.
137. In 1950, seven years after the federal government adopted termination as its
policy, Idaho repealed a constitutional provision prohibiting voting by “Indians not
taxed, who have not severed their tribal relations and adopted the habits of
civilization.” Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV.
591, 645–46 (2009) (citing PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 118
(Univ. of Ga. Press 1997). In 1951, South Dakota rescinded its statute stating that
Indians “maintaining tribal relations . . . cannot vote or hold office.” Id. Maine
amended its constitution in 1954 to remove the “Indians not taxed” exclusion from its
voting requirements. TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 91. Utah removed language from its
statutes in 1957 declaring reservation residents were not residents of the state for
purposes of voting. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 96–97. In 1960, two years before
the federal government abandoned termination as a policy, Minnesota amended its
constitution to remove a provision restricting Indian voting to “[p]ersons of mixed
white and Indian blood who have adopted the customs and habits of civilization and
[p]ersons of Indian blood . . . who have adopted the language, customs and habits of
civilization, after an examination before any district court of the State.” Berger, supra,
(citing MURRAY, supra).
138. See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 91.
139. Id.
140. 55 N.W. 1086 (Neb. 1893) (holding that Indians who had received
allotments under the GAA were qualified to vote and votes cast in precincts located
on Indian reservations were valid).
141. 178 N.W. 437 (N.D. 1920) (holding that sufficient evidence had been
presented to support the finding that trust patent Indians were civilized and had
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Garley (decided in 1948), Harrison v. Laveen (decided in 1948),
144
Acosta v. San Diego County (decided in 1954), and Montoya v. Bolack
145
(decided in 1962) represent the vanguard of these cases.
F.

Misplaced Battles and Missed Opportunities

Many people justifiably excoriate the defendants in the cases just
mentioned as racists. Evidence of bigotry appears at almost every
turn. Sadly, the motivations behind the defendants’ arguments have
overshadowed the most interesting and potentially beneficial part of
these cases—the arguments themselves. Regardless of motivation,
states defending the exclusion of reservation residents from voting in
state elections made many arguments tribes can only dream about
states making today, specifically, that reservations were, politically and
territorially, entirely separate from the state.
146
Tribes and tribal citizens reacted strangely to this new state po-

severed their tribal relations so that they met state voter qualifications).
142. MCCOOL ET AL., supra note 12, at 11–13. A New Mexico trial court decided
Trujillo in 1948. In Trujillo, a World War II veteran returned from the war to live on
his reservation and tried to register to vote in a state election. Id. at 13. He was told
he could not register because he was not a state resident and was an “Indian not
taxed.” Id. A three-judge panel held for Mr. Trujillo. Id. The court first concluded
that he was a state resident. The court went on to write:
We are unable to escape the conclusion that, under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, that constitutes a discrimination on the ground of
race. Any other citizen, regardless of race, in the State of New Mexico who
has not paid one cent of tax of any kind or character, if he possesses the
other qualification, may vote.
Id. The decision went unappealed and unreported, but resulted in a permanent
injunction against enforcing the “Indians not taxed” provision of the New Mexico
Constitution. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court later referenced Trujillo in the
process of deciding Montoya v. Bolack, holding that Indians living on the Navaho
Reservation met state residency requirements because the reservation was part of the
state. Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387, 390 (N.M. 1962).
143. 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948) (stating that the Indians’ relationship with the
federal government “resembles” that of a ward to its guardian but Indians are not
“under guardianship” as contemplated in Arizona Constitution and statutes).
144. 272 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that a residence on
reservation constitutes residence in the state entitling plaintiff to welfare benefits).
145. 372 P.2d 387 (N.M. 1962) (holding that those parts of the Navajo Reservation within the exterior boundaries of New Mexico were politically part of the state,
and therefore, reservation residents were state residents for voting purposes).
146. Tribes did not usually appear in these cases, but even when they did not, in
most instances pan-tribal political action groups, like NCAI, or other legitimately or
ostensibly pro-Indian organizations, supported and guided the litigation. Even in the
absence of such pan-tribal involvement, it is unlikely the tribe was unaware of the
case.
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sition. They had historically sought to secure guarantees of autonomy, almost without exception by treaty, even though the federal
government broke those promises with the exact same frequency.
They had filed law suits opposing exertions of state authority on
reservations, pursuing tribal rights all the way to the U.S. Supreme
Court, although they generally had lost ground. Then, when states
started making arguments in the Indian voting cases congruent with
tribes’ historic position, tribes and their citizens suddenly switched sides and
opposed those arguments in order to secure voting rights for reservation
citizens.
147
Porter v. Hall, the Arizona case overruled by Harrison v. Laveen,
presents a prime example of states making arguments congruent with
tribal sovereignty. In Porter, two Pima tribal citizens sought a writ of
mandamus requiring the county recorder to register them to vote.
148
The Arizona Attorney General’s Office represented the recorder.
Admitting that the recorder refused to register the plaintiffs, the state
argued
[t]hat the plaintiffs . . . are members of the Pima Tribe of
Indians, . . . residents of the Gila River Indian Reservation
and have never had . . . any residence other than upon . . .
the reservation, and have no property except on said reservation, and that the plaintiffs . . . were . . . and are now subject to all the rules and regulations and laws of the United
States enacted for the control and regulation of Indian reservations and Indian tribes. . . . That said . . . reservation, the
plaintiffs herein, and their property are . . . exclusively subject to
and under the jurisdiction of the laws and courts of the United
States and the tribal customs of said Pima Tribe, and are not subject
to the laws or within the jurisdiction of the state of Arizona. That
said . . . reservation while within the geographical boundaries of . . . Arizona is not subject to the laws of the state of Arizona,
and is, therefore, not a part of the state of Arizona, either politically
or governmentally, . . . and that, therefore, plaintiffs are not
residents of the state of Arizona within the meaning of . . .
149
the Constitution of the State of Arizona.
Arizona’s presentation of this as its official position in a case argued
before its supreme court is nothing short of astounding. Arizona
could have argued it had authority over the reservation, despite

147.
148.
149.

271 P. 411, 412 (Ariz. 1928), overruled by Harrison, 196 P.2d at 457.
271 P. at 412.
Id. at 412–13 (emphasis added).
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150

language in its Enabling Act, but it chose not to. This choice stands
in stark contrast to the history of Indian law generally, which, among
other things, chronicles efforts by states to assume jurisdictional
151
control over tribal lands and subjugate tribal peoples. A ruling in
the state’s favor at the supreme court level adopting the state’s
reasoning could have had substantial ripple effects. Had the Arizona
Supreme Court agreed that the state had no claim to govern reservation lands, and that the reservation did not form part of the state, the
resulting decision would have bound the state to that position. Given
that a state’s jurisdiction cannot extend beyond its own territory, such
a holding would have seriously called into question, if not outright
overruled, all present and future exertions of state authority within
reservation borders —from regulation of hunting and fishing, to
zoning, to taxation.
The plaintiffs’ response was equally astonishing, although in a
disturbing way. According to the court, the plaintiffs essentially
denied their tribe had any sovereign character whatsoever, and was
simply a group of people with a common race:
Plaintiffs replied, admitting their race and residence as alleged in the answer, and that they were under the control of
the laws and rules of the United States governing Indian
reservations, but denying that they were subject to any Indian tribal customs, or that the reservation was not subject to the laws of
Arizona, and alleging that the United States exercises no
jurisdiction or control over them or their property, except
152
over certain property held in trust for them.
Interestingly, the Porter court found a way not to agree with either
side completely. It held that reservations were politically part of the
state, but that Indians were not competent to be voters because they
were “under guardianship,” equating Indians with people “non compos

150. Arizona’s Enabling Act disclaimed “all right” to lands “held by . . . Indian
tribes.” Id. at 414. However, the U.S. Supreme Court had essentially ruled that such
disclaimers did not operate to exclude state authority in Draper v. United States, 164
U.S. 240 (1896) (citing United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881)). The Porter
opinion ultimately relied on this reasoning. Porter, 271 P. at 414–16.
151. The focus of “Indian law” from a non-tribal prospective has always been to
transfer tribal lands into non-tribal hands. CALLOWAY, supra note 15, at 236 (“Alexis
de Tocqueville, a French visitor to the United States, observed the removal process
and concluded that, whereas the Spaniards had earned a reputation for brutality in
their dispossession of the Indians, the Americans had attained the same objective
under the pretense of legality and philanthropy.”). See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
152. Porter, 271 P. at 413 (emphasis added).
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mentis.” In the process of this rather offensive ruling, the court did
draw in part on basic American civics:
The theory on which democracy is founded is that every
person who is bound to obey the laws should participate in
making them, and, conversely, that every one who participates in making the laws should be subject to their jurisdiction. . . . It is almost unheared [sic] of in a democracy that
153
those who make the laws need not obey them.
The Porter court went on, quoting a similar Minnesota case, Opsahl v.
154
Johnson. The contestant in Opsahl challenged the results of a state
election on the basis that citizen-residents of the Red Lake Reservation had inappropriately voted in the election. Finding for the
contestant, the Porter court wrote:
[T]here are . . . cogent reasons urged by contestant against
holding mixed bloods living on Indian reservations entitled
to vote. The exercise of the elective franchise is participation in government and in the making of the laws to which
all the inhabitants of a nation, state, or municipality must
yield obedience. It cannot for a moment be considered that
the framers of the Constitution intended to grant the right
of suffrage to persons who were under no obligation to obey
the laws enacted as a result of such grant. Or, in other
words, that those who do not come within the operation of
the laws of the state, nevertheless shall have the power to
make and impose laws upon others. The idea is repugnant
to our form of government. No one should participate in
155
the making of laws which he need not obey.
The Opsahl court also analogized Indian voting to the Colonial
troubles with Britain, describing it as “another phase of the wrong
156
done in the taxation of the Colonies.” The Opsahl court ultimately
concluded:
[T]ribal Indians have not adopted the customs and habits of
civilization, within the purview of the elective franchise provisions of our Constitution, until they have adopted that
custom and habit which all other inhabitants must needs
adopt when they come into the state, namely that of yielding
157
obedience and submission to its laws.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 416.
Id. (citing Opsahl v. Johnson, 138 Minn. 42, 48, 163 N.W. 988, 990 (1917)).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Opsahl, 138 Minn. at 50, 163 N.W. at 991.
Id.
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Non-tribal governments disclaimed jurisdiction over tribal territory in other cases as well, and based those disclaimers in part on
158
fundamental American democratic theory. Some courts explicitly
rejected the proposition that Indians were categorically unable to
vote, but conditioned the ability to vote on a change in citizenship,
159
implicitly recognizing tribes as discrete, separate governments in the
same manner as Elk v. Wilkins. The Opsahl court essentially interpreted language associated with assimilation — “adopt[] the customs
160
and habits of civilization” —to mean Indians had to be similarly
situated to non-Indian state citizens in relation to the body politic
before they participated in the body politic with non-Indian citi161
zens—a fundamental fairness argument. Opsahl was not the only
162
case to do this.
158. See, e.g., Acosta v. San Diego County, 272 P.2d 92, 93–94 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1954) (“[D]efendant contends that reservation Indians are not residents of the
county for the purpose of obtaining [emergency welfare] relief.”).
159. See, e.g., Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387, 394 (N.M. 1962) (“We are
convinced that, for voting purposes, there is nothing in our constitution or in the
statutes which prohibits an Indian from voting in a proper election, provided he
fulfills the statutory requirements required of any other voter.”).
160. Opsahl, 138 Minn. at 45, 163 N.W. at 989.
161. Opsahl, 138 Minn. at 50–51, 163 N.W. at 991 (“We reach the conclusion that
tribal Indians have not adopted the customs and habits of civilization, within the
purview of the elective franchise provisions of our Constitution, until they have
adopted that custom and habit which all other inhabitants must needs adopt when
they come into the state, namely that of yielding obedience and submission to its laws.
No doubt the right of suffrage was by this state held out as an inducement to the
Indians to sever their tribal relations and adopt in all respects the habits and customs
of civilization, and that means a taking up to the burdens which the laws of the state
place upon all its inhabitants alike. This the Indian may do by taking up his abode
outside the reservation and there pursuing the customs and habits of civilization.”).
162. See, e.g., Porter v. Hall, 271 P. 411, 419 (Ariz. 1928) (“Whenever [the federal]
government shall determine in regard to any Indian or class of Indians that they are
[released from guardianship and placed in the ranks of citizens of the United States
and of the state of their residence], and that their status in regard to the responsibilities of citizenship is the same as that of any other citizen, the law of this state
considers them no longer ‘persons under guardianship’ . . . and they will be entitled
to vote on the same terms as all other citizens. But so long as the federal government
insists that, notwithstanding their citizenship, their responsibility under our law
differs from that of the ordinary citizen, and that they are, or may be, regulated by
that government, by virtue of its guardianship, in any manner different from that
which may be used in the regulation of white citizens, they are, within the meaning of
our constitutional provision, ‘persons under guardianship,’ and not entitled to
vote.”); Allen v. Merrell, 305 P.2d 490, 495 (Utah 1956) (“There is nothing in the
statute which prevents an Indian from becoming qualified to vote the same way as any
other citizen. All he has to do is to establish a residence in a part of the county where
. . . he assumes his responsibilities as a citizen by living on lands where he pays taxes,
either directly or through his rent, and otherwise removes the detachment and lack
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One is left to wonder why the plaintiff-side interests involved in
these cases—individual, tribal, pan-tribal, and non-Indian protribal —did not see the advantages of abstaining from participation in
state voting, and concomitantly, how problematic seeking state voting
rights was, especially in light of the position states had taken. Seeking
the right to vote meant agreeing that reservations were politically part
of surrounding states. If reservation territory equated to state
territory, states could more legitimately assert authority there. It was
an “either/or” proposition if a coherent, normative paradigm based
on commonly accepted democratic theory was anything but abandoned. Either reservations were part of states, and reservation
residents therefore state residents entitled to vote in state elections, or
the reservations were not part of states, and reservation citizens
belonged to separate territorial governments and had no voting rights
in state elections. The former meant states could exercise jurisdiction
within the reservation; the latter meant they could not. Any arrangement where state and tribal governments co-exist raises the specter of
multiple sovereignty, an inherent fallacy according to American
163
governmental theory. Courts have asserted that federal, state, and
164
Unfortunately, stating
tribal citizenship are not incompatible.
something—verbally or in a court opinion —does not make it so.
More importantly, these cases represented an opportunity to
show states and tribes that avoiding overlapping sovereignty was in
each government’s best interest. States could avoid being controlled
by electorates not subject to their laws or obligated to provide the
means to support government programs. Conversely, tribes could
avoid being subjected to state authority, and thereby be more
autonomous. In other words, states could not deny suffrage while
asserting jurisdiction, and tribes could not demand suffrage while
objecting to jurisdiction.
It is important to note that a person with tribal ancestry is not
necessarily politically “Indian.” Such a person is genetically Indian,
might be culturally “Indian,” and might even be entitled to tribal
citizenship, but until enrollment, he or she forms no part of the tribal

of interest in the affairs of the state which surrounds him on the reservation.”).
163. The problems implicit in dual sovereignty will be addressed infra, Parts III–
IV.
164. See, e.g., Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 763 (1931) (“[T]here is no
incompatibility between tribal membership and United States citizenship.”); United
States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) (“Citizenship is not incompatible with tribal
existence.”).
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body politic. A person merely ancestrally or culturally “Indian” who
lives off-reservation deserves all the civil rights protections state and
federal citizenship afford, including protection from racial discrimination in voting. On the other hand, individuals that are politically
“Indian” —i.e. enrolled tribal “members”—are citizens of another
sovereign. So long as that citizenship is kept separate, excluding
tribal citizens from voting in state elections is as legitimate as Texans
preventing citizens of Massachusetts from influencing the formation
of Texas law by voting in Texas elections, and vice versa. Trying to
claim sovereign independence as a citizen of one government, while
asserting civil rights protections under another government,
represents a conflicted paradigm, absent some form of limitation on
authority similar to the Tenth Amendment.
III. CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, CONSENT BY PARTICIPATION,
THE HUMAN TENDENCY TO SEEK POWER, AND IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO:
AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL AXIOMS
The fundamental tensions in federal law concerning tribes are:
(1) how federal, tribal, and state sovereignty compete; and (2) how
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of each sovereign
attempt to resolve that competition. Many non-tribal judges, officials,
and scholars have characterized the relationship and history between
these three sovereigns as “unique,” “special,” or “anomalous,” often in
an effort to explain aspects of Indian law at odds with basic concepts
165
of fairness and American democratic theory.
This is sophistry.
There is nothing new about sovereign competition. The history
between any two sovereigns is unique in some sense; nonetheless, the
same sovereign dynamics, and therefore solutions, apply. This is why
166
the past is prologue; it can provide useful examples.
The American Founding Fathers’ theoretical struggles and debates represent one such useful “prologue” for tribes. The Founders
faced the same essential dilemma as tribes—how to create an

165. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“The sovereignty
that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character.”); Washington v.
Confederate Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500–01 (1979);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–55 (1974) (describing the origin and nature of
the “special relationship” between tribes and the federal government); United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (upholding the Major Crimes Act and
characterizing the relationship between Indian tribes and the United States as
“anomalous” and “complex”).
166. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, sc. 1.
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equitable, sustainable system of government encompassing multiple
sovereigns that prevents one sovereign from swallowing another. The
Founders’ debates provide tribal proponents a tool with which to
gauge the perception and consequences of tribal political participation in the forums where law affecting tribes is made, i.e. non-tribal
167
American legislatures and courts. More importantly, the ways the
Founders framed these issues still resonate with Americans today on
an intuitive level. This resonance provides tribal proponents a lexicon
familiar to non-tribal interests with which to press tribal claims.
Approaching these issues from this perspective also could provide
advantages with courts that see “original intent” as their lodestar.
A. The Centrality of Consent and Voting as a Means of Expressing It
Much of the Founders’ concept of government came from the
168
Enlightenment’s social contract theorists, particularly John Locke.
As Locke wrote: “Men Being . . . by nature all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to
169
the political power of another, without his own consent.”
In
Federalist No. 22, Alexander Hamilton wrote: “The fabric of American Empire ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the People.
The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that

167. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 841, 844 (1990); Clinton, supra note 40, at 246–52; Johnson, supra note 47, at
987–89; Richard A. Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country; The DoubleEdged Sword of the Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising Out of Early Supreme
Court Opinions and the General Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REV. 35, 36 (1995) [hereinafter
Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country]; Richard A. Monette, A New
Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of
Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 623 (1994) [hereinafter Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes].
168. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
26–30 (1967); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 28–29 (3d ed. 2008); THOMAS L.
PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE 2 (1988); Clinton, supra note 40, at 127 n.35;
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2005); Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 155, 155 (2002) (“A mere listing of the primary and secondary
sources —from the Founding Fathers to today—that explicitly refer to Locke or
implicitly invoke his ideas would rival the Encyclopaedia Britannica in length. His
labor argument for property, in particular, has been especially influential.”).
169. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 49 (J.W. Gough ed., MacMillan 1946) (1690).
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pure original fountainhead of all legitimate authority.” “[T]he only
reason why a free and independent man was bound by human laws
171
was this —that he bound himself.” “To be bound otherwise than by
172
one’s own consent was to be reduced to slavery.” Some find fault
173
with social contract theorists’ concept of consent, but scholarly
arguments seem lost to popular acceptance, practicality, and sheer
174
use of this conceptualization of consent in American government.
Judges, scholars, and philosophers from Locke to modern times
have perceived the consent given by citizens and how it is expressed in
several ways. Citizens give what can be termed a general, initial
consent to the form and authority of a government in one of two ways:
175
(1) expressly, as through the naturalization process, or (2) implied176
ly, by maintaining a presence within the government’s territory and
177
However,
enjoying the benefits associated with that presence.

170. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(emphasis in original). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961); Clinton, supra note 167, at 844 (“[F]ederalist theory . . . generally
viewed consent of the governed through the constitutional social contract as the
fountainhead of governmental legitimacy.”). Hamilton thought one of the
weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation was that the people had never ratified
them. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 145–46 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961);
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, 339 (James Madison); Johnson, supra note 47, at 978 n.24.
171. BAILYN, supra note 168, at 174 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
172. Johnson, supra note 47, at 979; see also BAILYN, supra note 168, at 234 (“[H]e
who has authority ‘to restrain and control my conduct in any instance without my
consent hath in all.’”).
173. See, e.g., A. John Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Government, 18
GA. L. REV. 791, 802–03 (1984).
174. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against Tribal
Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 104 (2007).
175. 8 U.S.C. §§1421–1458 (2006).
176. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, IN TWO TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT § 119 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (1698) (“[E]very Man, that hath any
Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any Government, doth
thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of
that Government, during this Enjoyment, as anyone under it; whether this his Possession be of Land, to him and his Heirs for ever, or a Lodging only for a Week; or
whether it be barely travelling freely on the Highway . . . .”).
177. Birth constitutes a third type of implied general consent. Consent is implied
from birth in the territory, i.e. jus soli. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 880 (8th ed. 2004). It
is also implied from birth to a parent who is a citizen, i.e. jus sanguinis. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 880 (8th ed. 2004). In reality, however, the unborn cannot consent to
anything. The same can be said for children in general until they become self
sufficient enough to emigrate should they choose to do so, and assuming such
migration is possible. Consequently, this article limits itself to forms of consent that
can be given or withheld freely.
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citizens of a democratic government give another, more specific and
equally important, type of consent— ongoing, broad-based political
participation, including, but not limited to, voting.
“[T]he colonial theorists developed the belief that representatives to a legislative body are attorneys or agents of their constituents
and accountable for the use of the power which is delegated to them.
Representation so viewed implied the continuous day-by-day consent
178
of the governed.” “Government . . . gain[s] its authority from [the
179
180
people’s] continuous consent,” as expressed through voting.
“[C]onsent and the withholding of consent [are] the primary means
of holding government accountable for its actions. . . . Accountability
is not simply a response to crises or abuses, but rather is a feature of
181
the routine conduct of the public policy process.” In other words,
voting in periodic elections provides the mechanism through which
Americans attempt to ensure that the government accurately and
continuously reflects the will of the people. U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Stephen Breyer calls this “active liberty,” i.e. “‘an active and
constant participation in collective power’” and a “sharing of a
182
nation’s sovereign authority among its people.” Professor Hill and
183
Justice Breyer are far from alone in their perspectives.
B. Self-Interested Power Seeking and Imperium in Imperio
Much has been written about the intensity of the disagreements
preceding the adoption of our present Constitution. Great men
engaged in high-minded debates, newspaper articles traded barbs,
184
and delegates took hostages to achieve quorum when necessary.

178. Johnson, supra note 47, at 978.
179. BAILYN, supra note 1688, at 173.
180. Francis R. Hill, Putting Voters First: An Essay On The Jurisprudence Of Citizen
Sovereignty In Federal Election Law, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 155, 158 (2006) (The consent
that forms the basis of American government is “a process of continuing consent,
expressed through continuing participation.”) (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 159.
182. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5, 15 (2005).
183. See, e.g., J. P. PLAMENATZ, CONSENT, FREEDOM AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 168,
170–71 (2d ed. 1968) (“Where there is an established process of election to an office,
then, provided the election is free, anyone who takes part in the process consents to the
authority of whoever is elected to the office.”) (emphasis added); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 11–14 (1948);
PETER SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE 50–51 (1973); Alan Gewirth, Political
Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 137–38 (Richard B. Brandt ed. 1972).
184. CECELIA M. KENYON, MEN OF LITTLE FAITH: THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS ON THE
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But as much as early Americans disagreed over the proposed Constitution, it was what they agreed on from which we can learn the most in
the present context. The fact that the opposing sides agreed on
certain principles of government gives some indication of the validity
of these ideas. Advocates both for and against the new Constitution
had a clear idea of how much was at stake, the basic needs of the new
nation, and the theoretical tensions at issue. They disagreed mainly
about whether the new Constitution sufficiently met those challenges,
not what the challenges were.
They agreed that human beings were self-interested and therefore power-seeking by nature. “Brutus,” considered one of the most
well-reasoned and articulate of the Anti-Federalist essayists, wrote in
1787: “[I]t is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages,
that every man, and every body of men, invested with power, are ever
disposed to increase it, and to acquire a superiority over every thing
185
that stands in their way.”
Professor Jack N. Rakove of Stanford
wrote:
[This] presumption . . . bore the imprint of the ideology
that had carried the colonists from resistance to revolution
in the decade before independence: the belief that the innate human craving for power would exploit any opportunity to exercise dominion. Create a constitution that merely
permitted the abuse of power, this theory predicted, and
those who wielded it would soon find and exploit its weakest
186
points for their own insidious and ambitious ends.
They also agreed that if two sovereigns try to exert authority over
the same people, territory, or both, at the same time, one will

NATURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1955), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, at
xxi–xxiv (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., Northeastern University Press 1985) (1966); THE
ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, at
27–28 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., Northeastern University Press 1985) (1888); see also
THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, at 241 (Ralph Ketcham ed., insert
publisher here 2003) (1986) (“The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of
the Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constituents,” PENNSYLVANIA PACKET AND
DAILY ADVERTISER, December 18, 1787).
185. “BRUTUS,” ESSAY I (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, at 275 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2003) (1986)
(“Brutus,” Essay I, New York Journal, Oct. 18, 1787).
186. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 182–83 (1996); see also KENYON, supra note 184, at xliv, lxii–lxv.
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187

necessarily succumb to the other. Political commentators of the
188
time referred to this concept as “imperium in imperio.” Any assertion
189
The Federalists
to the contrary was an absurdity, a “solecism.”
accepted the validity of this concept, but thought the new Constitution sufficiently, although not completely, addressed the problem with
its innovative approach to division of power—the reserved rights
190
concept embodied in the Tenth Amendment.
The Federalists
thought the Anti-Federalists were simply too afraid of the novelty to
191
try it.
187. THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION
OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, at 244 (Ralph Ketcham ed.,
2003) (1986); THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 184, at 244 (“The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to their
Constituents . . . .”). (“We apprehend that two co-ordinate sovereignties would be a
solecism in politics. That therefore as there is no line of distinction drawn between
the general, and state governments; as the sphere of their jurisdiction is undefined it
would be contrary to the nature of things, that both should exist together, one or the
other would necessarily triumph in the fullness of dominion.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
20, at 134 (James Madison and Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(“Federalist No. 20: The Same Subject Continued” (Madison with Hamilton)).
188. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003).
189. “1. Impropriety in language, or a gross deviation from the rules of syntax;
incongruity of words; want of correspondence or consistency. A barbarism may be in
one word; a solecism must be of more. 2. Any unfitness, absurdity or impropriety.”
WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828).
190. The Tenth Amendment started out as a mainstay of Constitutional
jurisprudence. Patrick M. Garry, A One-Sided Federalism Revolution: The Unaddressed
Constitutional Compromise on Federalism and Individual Rights, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
851, 851–64, 873–77 (2006); David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Rediscovery
of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 339–78 (1996). However, it became
somewhat of a dead letter from the late 1930s to the mid 1990s. Garry, supra, at 861–
66; Mayer, supra, at 379–410. It has enjoyed somewhat of a revival since the
Rehnquist Court. Garry, supra, at 866-73; Mayer, supra, at 388-410.
191. RAKOVE, supra note 186, at 162 (citing 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 989, 995–96 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1990)
(Madison wrote that the “only way to judge the Constitution was to ‘consider it
minutely in its parts’” while recognizing that ‘[i]t is in a manner unprecedented: We
cannot find one express example in the experience of the world:—It stands by
itself.’”); RAKOVE, supra note 1866, at 181; THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 103 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Federalist No. 15: The Insufficiency of the
Present Confederation to Preserve the Union” (Hamilton)) (“While [the AntiFederalists] admit that the government of the United States is destitute of energy,
they contend against conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply
that energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an
augmentation of federal authority without a diminution of State authority; at
sovereignty in the Union and complete independence in the members. They still, in
fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium in
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Interestingly, Anti-Federalists had some fairly specific ideas of
how and how fast this consolidation would occur. Two main theories
existed. Some thought the new Constitution squeezed the states out
192
from the beginning; others thought the process would happen over
time, bit by bit, federal law by federal law, federal judgment by federal
193
judgment. “Brutus” thought the process would happen over time.
“[A]lthough the government reported by the Convention does not go
to a perfect and entire consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it,
194
that it must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”
Five aspects of the proposed government represented the greatest risk of consolidation of power, according to the Anti-Federalists:
(1) the creation of a standing federal army, (2) the unlimited nature
of the federal government’s authority to tax, (3) the malleability of
the “Necessary and Proper” Clause, (4) the potential for abuse of the
Supremacy Clause, and (5) the independence of the federal judi195
ciary.
Anti-Federalists worried the states would have no revenue
because any conflict between state and federal taxation would be
trumped by the Supremacy Clause as interpreted by the Federal
Judiciary and enforced by federal troops. Anti-Federalists also
thought the ambiguity of the Necessary and Proper Clause meant the
legislative authority of the federal government would eventually be
interpreted as boundless, and ultimately be used by federal courts
again wielding the Supremacy Clause to abolish state laws at will,
again backed up by federal forces. In other words, the AntiFederalists thought they would end up having hostile federal laws

imperio.”).
192. KENYON, supra note 184, at xlii–xliii.
193. RAKOVE, supra note 186, at 181 (“[C]onsolidation had two distinct meanings
[to the Anti-Federalists]: one descriptive, one predictive. They did not entirely agree
whether consolidation inhered in the ‘absolute and uncontroulable’ the Union would
immediately possess over those ‘objects’ placed under its control; or whether it was
better conceived as a tendency that would unfold gradually but ineluctable as the new
government deployed its powers and monopolized the most productive sources of
revenue to render the states impotent for all effective purposes of government.”).
“Centinel,” an Anti-federalist essayist, wrote: “It is a solecism in politics for two coordinate sovereignties to exist together, you must separate the sphere of their
jurisdiction, or after running the race of dominion for some time, one would
necessarily triumph over the other.” CENTINEL NO. 5 (July 31, 1789), reprinted in 14
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, at 343-48
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983), available at
http://www.consource.org/index.asp?bid=582&documented=270.
194. “BRUTUS,” ESSAY I (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 271 (Ralph Ketcham ed.) (1986).
195. RAKOVE, supra note 186, at 183–88; KENYON, supra note 184, at xlii–xlvii.
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broadly interpreted and unilaterally imposed on their states with their
196
only recourse being to a biased court —a proposition strikingly
similar to that faced by tribes today.
IV. COUNTING THE GREEKS IN THE HORSE: PARSING THE
IMPLICATIONS OF TRIBAL PARTICIPATION IN NON-TRIBAL POLITICS
Part II began this article with an examination of what tribes and
tribal citizens have gained through participation in non-tribal politics.
Part IV will close the substantive sections of this article with the other
side of the equation —how tribes risk their sovereignty by participating.
A. Tribal Consent to Non-Tribal Authority
Without question, tribes and tribal citizens have fully and voluntarily engaged in the kinds of “active liberty” that constitute consent to
be governed by both state and national government. They have
fervently sought, at incredible time and expense, to be included in the
“process of continuing consent, expressed through continuing
197
participation.” Their efforts have been aimed at being part of the
electorate to whom elected officials are accountable, and whose will
those officials are supposed to reflect, under pain of loss of office.
They engage in the exact same activities non-tribal communities do
and direct those activities at the same institutions non-tribal citizens
do with increasing success.
Individuals with tribal ancestry who are not enrolled in a tribe
and do not live on the tribe’s reservation provide a useful foil and
point of analytical departure. Individuals that fit this description have
no nexus with tribal government. They are not part of the tribal body
politic and do not live in the territory governed by the tribe. Consequently, they present no opportunity for tribal government to conflict

196. With regard to the proposed powers of the Supreme Court, “Brutus” wrote
that they would, “operate to effect, in the most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible manner, what is evidently the tendency of the constitution—I mean, an entire
subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states.
Every adjudication of the supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the
nature and extent of the general government, will affect the limits of the state
jurisdiction. In proportion as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will
that of the latter be restricted. BRUTUS, ESSAY XI (1788), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 296 (Ralph
Ketcham ed., Mentor Pub. 2003) (1986).
197. See Hill, supra note 180.
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with another sovereign, state or national. They are only genetically,
and possibly culturally, “Indian,” but not politically. Non-tribal antidiscrimination laws, like the Voting Rights Act, legitimately protect
the rights of these individuals within the sovereigns to which they
belong.
Tribal citizens, on the other hand, are politically “Indian.” When
tribal citizens participate in state and federal politics, they literally
embody the unification of tribal, state, and federal sovereignty. Their
participation amounts to consent to be governed by all three,
bringing tribal sovereignty into conflict with federal and state
sovereignty. If tribal citizens reside on the reservation when they
participate—i.e. if they are reservation citizens—they invite state
government onto the reservation, validating existing assertions of
198
non-tribal authority there and inviting future assertions.
The
problem manifests when these individuals, or non-Indians within
tribal territory, are presented with conflicting laws. In such a situation,
which do they follow, and which will be enforced by the courts? Over
time, which laws will generally dominate, giving force to the customs
and values of the culture that made them? This conflict is played out
199
throughout the body of Indian law.
198. Participation in tribal political processes by tribal citizens who live off
reservation presents an interesting and problematic inverse corollary. See infra Part
IV.C.2.; S.E. Ruckman, Creeks Step Closer to Constitutional Amendment, NATIVE AM. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2009, at 1.
199. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (holding that
inherent sovereignty did not enable the Tribe to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing in taken areas); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that an Indian
tribe may not assert criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian); Brendale v.
Confederate Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding
that the tribe had authority to zone property in areas of its reservation that were
closed to the general public); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202, 215 (1987) (holding state and local laws may be applied to on-reservation
activities of tribes and tribal members, even though not expressly authorized by
Congress, when state authority is not pre-empted by the operation of federal law; preemption occurs when state jurisdiction interferes or is incompatible with federal and
tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless state interests at stake are sufficient to
justify the assertion of state authority); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563
(1981) (holding that the Crow Indian Tribe had no power to regulate non-Indian
fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe);
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980) (quoting
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1831)) (holding state motor carrier
and fuel tax pre-empted from application to logging company doing business with
tribe in tribal territory); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(holding that Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try
and punish non-Indians for crimes committed on a reservation); McClanahan v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (holding Arizona income tax inapplica-
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The establishment of state legislative districts within reservations,
and the election of reservation citizens to represent those districts,
essentially, if not literally, make reservations part of the surrounding
200
state and suggest that tribes consent to state authority. By sending a
reservation citizen to the state legislature to represent a district that
encompasses reservation lands, tribes put themselves on the same
level with other political subdivisions of the state over which the state
has considerable authority. Equating reservation lands with state
political subdivisions marginalizes the perception of tribes as separate
governments with independent sovereign powers, and makes them
appear more like counties and cities, i.e. simple organizational
substructures incorporated under the authority of the state and
subject to that authority.
The one political activity that tribes can, and historically have,
engaged in that does not amount to consent to be governed is
lobbying. Tribes have advocated their position to non-tribal governments and communities since first contact without such behavior
201
being seen as categorically unfair or an implied invitation to govern.
Tribes and non-tribal governments termed these efforts as “negotiations” when tribes were universally seen as separate; “lobbying” is just
the name they have been given since non-tribal governments laid
sovereign claim to tribal citizens and lands.
Some might assert that concerns about the consequences of participation are merely theoretical, that the Supreme Court has shown a
willingness to give some measure of substance to tribal sovereignty,
that federal policy at the moment supports self-determination, and
that Congress has clearly rejected the extinction of tribes as a goal.
These observations do provide a measure of reassurance. However,

ble to reservation citizen who derived all her income from reservation sources);
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (holding that state statutes control in the Cherokee
town of New Echota, which overlapped with Gwinnett county, Georgia); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (denying an injunction to restrain the
State of Georgia from executing and enforcing the laws of Georgia within the
Cherokee territory).
200. Such annexation is usually considered an act of war absent consent. James P.
Terry, The President as Commander in Chief, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 391, 455 (2009)
(describing Iraq annexation/occupation of Kuwait); Robert D. Sloane, The Changing
Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 107,
134 (2002) (describing Chinese annexation of Tibet); Shaun Walker, Ossetians Warm
to Moscow’s Embrace, INDEP. ON SUNDAY, Aug. 9, 2009, at News (describing Russian
annexation of part of Georgia).
201. Some question the fairness of tribes being able to donate in the amounts
recently seen, but few, if any, have questioned the ability of tribes to lobby generally.
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these machinations of imperium in imperio are best seen from the
202
“forest” level over time, and the U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly used participation-based reasoning—as opposed to territory-based
or Indian/non-Indian race-based reasoning —to resolve sovereignty
conflicts contrary to tribal interests.
The Court has clearly relied on participation-based reasoning in
203
the area of tribal criminal jurisdiction, stating reluctance “to adopt a
view of tribal sovereignty that would single out [a] group of citizens,
nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include
204
them.” The Supreme Court just as clearly relied on participationbased reasoning in the area of tribal regulatory authority over noncitizens. The rules for determining the extent of a tribe’s authority
within its own territory turn in part on whether non-tribal citizens and
205
non-Indian lands are involved.
Tribes’ inherent civil regulatory
authority generally does not apply to “nonmembers” on “non-Indian”
land and extends only to what is “necessary to protect tribal self206
government or to control internal relations.” In a case about landuse regulation, the Court explicitly compared reservation citizens and
non-Indian residents in terms of population, land ownership, ability
to vote in county elections, ability to vote in tribal elections, and
207
access to tribal services. The Court has made member/nonmember

202. See infra Part IV.B.
203. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court made specific note of the
large non-Indian presence on the reservation in terms of both land ownership and
population, and that nonmembers could not serve on tribal juries. 435 U.S. 191, 193
n.1, 193–94, 194 n.4 (1978). Oliphant ultimately held that the exercise by tribes of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was “inconsistent with [tribes’] status” and
contrary to the federal government’s “great solicitude that its citizens be protected by
the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.” Id. at 208,
210 (emphasis in original). Duro v. Reina similarly concluded that jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians is an “external” power “inconsistent with the Tribe’s dependent
status.” 495 U.S. 676, 684, 686 (1990). Duro explicitly based part of its reasoning on
the inability of nonmember Indians to participate in the government prosecuting
them. Id. at 693–94; see, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme
Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 665–68 (2003) (explaining
that the longstanding notion of “retained inherent sovereignty . . . is compatible with
core American values”). Interestingly, participation concerns do not factor in the
state context, or even the international context, absent obvious disparities in
procedural protections. See also COHEN, supra note 45, at 226–28.
204. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
205. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997); Brendale, 492 U.S. at 446;
Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–65; see also COHEN, supra note 45, at 229–32 (explaining that
it matters whether tribal or non-citizens are involved).
206. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–65.
207. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 445–47.
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demographics a factor to consider in diminishment cases where
208
guidance is not found from treaties, statutes, or legislative history.
Admittedly, these cases and rules use demographics to make
needed divisions between tribal and state sovereignty, but the balance
of power has fallen much farther in favor of the opposing sovereignty
than in other non-tribal contexts. If a court or legislature sought to
justify further state authority inside reservations, it would be a simple
matter to shift the focus of inquiry from how non-tribal citizens
cannot participate in tribal political processes, to how tribal citizens
consent to state authority by participating in state political processes.
Such a shift represents a legitimate hazard given the susceptibility of
federal Indian law to changes in federal policy and non-tribal courts’
209
willingness to rationalize that policy. Moreover, tribes are not well
positioned from an advocacy standpoint to counter such a shift given
that willingness to participate in a democratic process equates to a
willingness to be bound by the products of that process.
B. Imperium in Imperio: A Cancer in Indian Country
Tribal consent to state and federal authority via participation
210
brings the problem of multiple sovereignties squarely into play.
Unfortunately, the problem faced by tribes is more complicated than
that faced by the Founders. In the federal-state context, federal
sovereignty overlaps the sovereignty of each state, but states do not
overlap each other individually. This limited the difficulty faced by
The Founders to coherently segregating authority between two
sovereign spheres, not three. Participation by tribes in federal and
state elections creates a three-way competition for governance for
which no stable or coherent, i.e., normative, answer presently exists.
The Marshallian conception of the relationship between these

208. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356–57 (1998); Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470–72 nn.12–13 (1984) (“When an area is predominately
populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments,
finding that the land remains Indian country seriously burdens the administration of
State and local governments. . . . Resort to subsequent demographic history is, of
course, an unorthodox and potentially unreliable method of statutory interpretation.
However, in the area of surplus land acts, where various factors kept Congress from
focusing on the diminishment issue, technique is a necessary expedient.”); Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 602–14 (1977).
209. See infra Part IV.B.
210. One federal official during the allotment period used the term “imperium in
imperio” to describe the tribal sovereign dilemma 125 years ago. Gates, supra note 79,
at 49 (“Politically [the tribe] is an anomaly—an imperium in imperio.”).
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spheres of sovereignty kept them relatively separate. However, they
have gone from a position of relative separation to substantial overlap,
resulting in steady losses of tribal sovereignty via judicial decision,
along much the same lines as Anti-Federalists feared would result
under the present U.S. Constitution.
The Founders originally thought of tribes and tribal territories as
entirely separate up to the point that the federal government
211
extinguished a tribe’s right of occupancy.
Chief Justice John
212
Marshall had great “conceptual clarity” about the division between
tribes, states, and the federal government, stating that (1) tribal
territory was distinct from state territory, (2) states did not have
authority in tribal territory and state citizens could not venture there
without permission from the tribe or the federal government, and (3)
the federal government had exclusive authority to deal with tribes, but
213
none to regulate their internal affairs.
The Court since has
consistently confirmed tribal authority over its citizens and their
214
activities within the tribal territory; however, exercises of tribal
sovereignty in this context do not compete with any other sovereign.
Competition occurs when tribes assert authority over non-Indians or
non-citizen Indians within tribal territory, or states assert any type of
authority within tribal territory. Tribal authority in these contexts has
215
steadily diminished.
The broadest rejection of tribal jurisdiction over non-citizens
came in the criminal area. In 1978, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
216
Tribe, the U.S. Supreme Court held that tribes lacked any amount of
criminal jurisdiction over “non-Indians” regardless of where jurisdiction was asserted (e.g., Indian fee land, tribally held land, federally

211. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832); supra note 31.
212. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
213. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
214. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71–72 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978). The powers of Indian tribes are not
delegated, but instead are “inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never
been extinguished.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322–23 (quoting FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945) (“Indian tribes still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result
of their dependent status.”); id. at 323 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
215. COHEN, supra note 45, at 220, 224–37 (“[B]eginning in 1978, the Supreme
Court has substantially limited tribal power over nonmembers.”; “[Nevada v.] Hicks fits
within the recent trend of decisions disfavoring tribes’ power to govern the conduct
of nonmembers . . . .”).
216. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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217

held land, or non-Indian fee land). In contrast, the Supreme Court
has generally upheld tribal assertions of regulatory authority over noncitizens within tribal territory so long as the land where the assertion
occurs is held by the tribe, the federal government, or a tribal
218
citizen.
However, the presumption reverses on non-Indian fee
219
220
In 1981, the Court wrote that
land and public rights-of-way.
“exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
221
express congressional delegation.” Exceptions exist for non-citizens
entering “consensual relationships,” and “conduct [that] threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
222
or the health or welfare of the tribe.” At first glance, the rule and
exceptions seem capable of broad interpretation, akin to the “health,
safety and welfare” phrasing of broadly construed state police powers.
Unfortunately, interpretations in 1997 and 2001 have taken a
223
narrower position.
Turning to where states have sought to assert jurisdiction within
tribal territory, the U.S. Supreme Court backed away from “reliance
224
on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty” in the early 1970s. In the
1980s, the Court acknowledged that it had fully “departed from Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a State] can have no
force’ within reservation boundaries,” abandoning a “rigid rule” in
217. See also supra note 196 (explaining Oliphant’s implications on criminal
jurisdiction non-Indians). The Court later expanded this to prohibit tribal
jurisdiction over non-citizen Indians. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S 676 (1990). Congress
quickly authorized tribal jurisdiction in such circumstances. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(2006); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
218. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981). Cf. Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 433–48
(suggesting that limitation of access by the general public to non-citizen fee lands is
sufficient for tribal regulatory authority).
219. Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–65.
220. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454–56 (1997) (state highway
equated to non-Indian fee land for purposes of determining adjudicative jurisdiction;
neither Montana exception met; not consensual because suit sounded in tort; not the
contract that brought the defendant into tribal territory; provision of governmental
services not sufficient to be meet consensual exception).
221. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
222. Id. at 565-66.
223. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 438; Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647
(2001) (Navaho Tribe could not tax non-Indian guests of hotel located on non-Indian
fee land); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); see also COHEN, supra note 45, at 220,
224–37.
224. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
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favor of a balancing approach that allowed consideration of state
interests in deciding whether to enforce state laws within tribal
225
territory. More recently, Justice Scalia forcefully stated that “[s]tate
226
sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s border,” thus marking
227
Tribal
“the decline and fall” of Marshallian conceptual clarity.
sovereignty now forms a mere “backdrop” against which state, federal,
228
and tribal interests are all considered.
Sometimes the balance
229
230
Standard
weighs in favor of tribes; sometimes it does not.
conceptions of sovereignty no longer provide a “definitive resolu231
tion” to issues that would be simple questions in the state-state
232
context. At one point, a third of the Supreme Court suggested a

225. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, at 141–45 (1980)
(quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515, 520 (1832)). State motor
carrier and fuel tax pre-empted from application to logging company doing business
with tribe in tribal territory); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202, at 215–16 (1987) (holding that state and local laws may be applied to onreservation activities of tribes and tribal members, even though not expressly
authorized by Congress, when state authority is not pre-empted by the operation of
federal law; noting that pre-emption occurs when state “jurisdiction interferes or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless state
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority”) (quoting
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983)); see also South
Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
226. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361–62. Hicks appears to be very nearly a polar opposite of
Worcester. Where Chief Justice John Marshall drew a line in the sand when Georgia
reached into Cherokee Territory, Justice Scalia trumpeted the breach of the Fallon
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe’s border when Nevada law enforcement rushed into Fallon
Paiute-Shoshone Tribe’s Territory.
227. THOMAS T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 112–13 (2002).
228. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (1973) (“The Indian sovereignty doctrine is
relevant . . . because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and
federal statutes must be read.”); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143 (citing McClanahan, 411 U.S.
at 164).
229. E.g., Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202 (finding the state lacked sufficient interest to
regulate bingo activities on tribal land); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 136 (finding federal law
preempted state tax on tribal logging operations); McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164
(finding income tax on Indians unlawful as applied to income wholly derived from
reservation activities).
230. E.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (holding
the state could impose severance taxes on reservation oil production by non-Indian
lessees); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 154–59 (1980) (permitting the state to tax non-Indians’ purchases of cigarettes
from on-reservation tribal retailers); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 481–83 (1976) (permitting state cigarette tax on
Indian sales to non-Indians).
231. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
232. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 227, at 110 (“States are generally understood to have
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rule that state regulation of commercial reservation activities that are
unlawful under state law is permissible unless and until Congress
233
indicates otherwise.
Taking a broader perspective on the matter, these losses have
come in a manner eerily similar to how the Anti-Federalists thought
the federal government would consume the states over time, supporting the assertion that imperium in imperio is at least partially to blame.
Since the clear Marshallian construction of tribal sovereignty, tribes
have lost pieces of sovereignty, bit by bit, law by law, judgment by
judgment: the ability to protect their citizens from crime regardless of
234
the perpetrator’s race (1854, 1885, 1946, 1978, 1990), the ability to
manage and protect their environment by uniform regulation
235
throughout their territory (1989), the ability to develop their
economies and infrastructures through exclusive uniform taxation
236
(1980, 1989, 2001, 2005), basic respect for their borders (1903,

the authority to regulate (and tax) the activities of non-Indians on reservations; . . . .
This analysis, of course, differs significantly from principles of federalism and comity
that underlie relationships among the states and between states and the federal
government. A citizen of Montana who ventures to Wyoming is fully subject to
Wyoming civil and criminal jurisdiction, and federal power cannot generally provide
Montanans immunity from Wyoming courts for a crime committed in Cheyenne . . . .
American constitutional law does not treat these as difficult questions.”).
233. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 222–27 (Stevens, J., O’Connor, J., and Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
234. Indian Country Crimes Act of 1854, ch. 24, § 3, 10 Stat. 270 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2008)) (extending the general laws of the United
States to offenses committed by non-Indians in Indian country); Major Crimes Act of
1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362–85 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2008))
(removing tribal jurisdiction over a set of “major” crimes committed by Indians
against Indians); Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–511, 104 Stat. 1892–93
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2001)) (restoring tribal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding the
Double Jeopardy Clause could not bar federal prosecution of a non-member Indian
in Federal Court despite the defendant having been punished in tribal court); Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (finding tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (finding
tribes lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); Williams v. United States,
327 U.S. 724 (1946) (finding federal laws covering rape applicable to Indian
reservations through the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13).
235. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989) (limiting tribal authority to zone fee land located within reservation but
owned by non-Indians).
236. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99 (2005)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (permitting state tax on off-reservation receipt of motor
fuel by non-Indian fuel distributors who delivered to station owned by Indians on
Indian land). “Both the Nation and the State have authority to tax fuel sales at the
[tribe-owned gas station]. As a practical matter, however, the two tolls cannot coexist.
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237

1960, 1998, 2001), and the ability to protect their citizens from the
238
unlawful assertions of authority by foreign governments (2001).
Moreover, clear analogies exist between these losses and AntiFederalist concerns regarding competition for tax revenue, broad
interpretations of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and abuse of the
Supremacy Clause by federal courts. There is no reason to think
these losses will end before little remains for tribes to govern in their
own territories.
C. Alternatives to Passive Sovereign Erosion
If tribal participation brings tribal sovereignty into conflict with
federal and state sovereignty in the absence of a limiting factor like
the Tenth Amendment, and those conflicts will result in continued
losses of sovereignty over time, two questions present themselves:
“What can tribes do, if anything?” and “What should tribes do, if
anything?” As the current course of tribal participation seems
destined to erode tribal sovereignty with no tribal control of the
process, the two alternatives appear to be: (1) active pursuit of
incorporation, or (2) active pursuit of some measure of separation.

If the Nation imposes its tax on top of Kansas’ tax, then unless the Nation operates
[its gas station] at a substantial loss, scarcely anyone will fill up at its pumps.
Effectively double-taxed, the [gas station] must operate as an unprofitable venture, or
not at all.” Id. at 116 (citations omitted). See also Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645, 653–59 (2001) (finding tribe lacked authority to impose hotel taxes on nonIndian guests at hotel located on non-Indian fee land within the reservation); Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S 163 (1989) (finding concurrent state and
tribal jurisdiction with regard to the imposition of severance taxes on oil and gas
production by non-members); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (finding concurrent jurisdiction of state and tribal
governments to tax cigarette purchases by non-members).
237. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (finding tribal court lacked
jurisdiction to try tort claims arising from state officials investigation of off-reservation
crime on the reservation); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S.
99 (1960) (permitting government taking of Indian fee land for hydraulic power
project); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–67 (1903) (finding Congress has
authority to abrogate treaties with Indians); United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 520–
21 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding non-enclave federal drug law enforceable on tribal land
because the law did not impermissibly affect the rights of Indians); see generally
COHEN, supra note 45, at 128–32; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of
General Application to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85
(1991) (arguing that an overriding national interest must exist to apply silent federal
laws, on a matter not cover by treaty, to Indian nations).
238. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (finding tribal court lacked jurisdiction
to try tort claims arising from state officials investigation of off-reservation crime on
the reservation).
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need to be made on both the federal and state levels.

The Federal-Tribal Relationship

Considerable hurdles stand in the way of tribes formally incorporating into the federal union as “States of the Union,” foremost being
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution —”no new
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
240
State.” Arguments could be made regarding whether reservations
are “within” a state, but the success of any such effort is doubtful
without amending the Federal Constitution, which is improbable.
A return to a measured separation based on negotiated treaties
would be the simplest alternative to adopt, but also presents considerable hurdles. Precedent for such a relationship exists—everything
prior to 1871—and this approach could adequately limit federal
authority if a credible retained-rights approach is applied to treaty
241
interpretation.
However, two time-honored sources of guidance
suggest that pursuing this approach will be unsuccessful—history and
common sense. Historically, non-tribal interests have proven unable
to honor treaty agreements and non-tribal courts have consistently
increased the breadth of federal and state authority over tribes and
tribal lands. On the common sense front, a return to treaty-making is
unlikely so long as tribal citizens continue to participate in federal
political processes; governments do not negotiate treaties with their
own citizens.
On the other hand, significant arguments can be marshaled for
continued federal participation. Little reason exists to believe that
federal lawmaking with regard to tribes will suddenly cease, or that
tribes will abruptly be exempted from all federal laws of “general

239. “Decisions” in this context could take many forms. All decisions affecting the
political/governmental substance of the body politic should receive approval from
the body politic in some form.
240. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3, cl. 1.
241. See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322–23 (1978) (holding that the powers of
Indian tribes are not delegated, but instead are “‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty
which has never been extinguished.[;]’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting COHEN ‘S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)). “Indian tribes still possess those
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a
necessary result of their dependent status.” Id. at 323 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191
(1978))); see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1905) (holding that
treaties are not “a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from them—a
reservation of those not granted”).
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242

applicability.” Consequently, if those controlled by the products of
a government’s political processes have a right to participate in those
processes, then tribal citizens have a right to participate in federal
political processes. While this reasoning has an uncomfortable “selffulfilling” aspect, it makes sense and may be unavoidable. However,
for continued federal participation to work long term, an answer to
the imperium in imperio problem must be found.
The details of a new federal-tribal relationship exceed the scope
of this article, but some contours can be sketched. The first step
would be recognizing the illegitimacy of plenary power, legally and
ethically. It has no basis in the Constitution, and runs contrary to any
concept of limited federal power or government by consent. It was
adopted by a Court seeking to rationalize a federal policy antithetical
to tribal sovereignty, and as such represents a kind of judicial activism
criticized in other contexts.
The second step would be repealing the grants of authority made
under Public Law 280 absent tribal consent. Again, these grants run
contrary to the concept that a legitimate government must be based
on the consent of those governed.
Third, sustainable federal participation would require returning
to a credible retained rights analysis of treaties as envisioned by United
243
244
States v. Wheeler and United States v. Winans. This would largely serve
the same purpose the Tenth Amendment serves between the federal
government and the states. Alternatively, federal and tribal governments could negotiate a new affirmative uniform boundary for federal
power vis-à-vis the tribes, modeled after Tenth Amendment.
Fourth, a sustainable federal-tribal relationship based on mutual
respect and consent would require retrocession of governmental
authority over all lands located within the exterior boundaries of all
reservations. Tribes lost their exclusive authority over these lands as
the result of unilateral and vulgar assertions of power —the Indian
Country Crimes Act, the Assimilative Crimes Act, the Major Crimes
Act, General Allotment Act and various Termination Acts. Without
such a retrocession, allotment and termination have never truly
ended because the consequences of these policies—the destruction

242. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116–17
(1960) (holding that general acts of Congress with terms applying to all people
include Indians); COHEN, supra note 45, at 128–32; Skibine, supra note 237.
243. 435 U.S. at 322–23.
244. 198 U.S. at 381 (holding that treaties are not “a grant of rights to the Indians,
but a grant of right from them, a reservation of those not granted”).
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of tribal territories —have been perpetuated. Any argument defending the status quo simply makes the arguer complicit in the original
245
unjust act.
Some authors have expressed concern that participating in federal political processes will essentially hollow out tribes, culturally and
246
governmentally.
However, evidence that culture can survive
incorporation into the federal fabric exists—the states themselves.
One of the goals of the American federal arrangement was to allow
individual states to retain their individual culture and law by only
establishing as much centralized government as was necessary and
leaving the states as much authority as possible to control their own
247
dominions. Disagreement can be had about the level of success the
248
United States has achieved on this front, but no one thinks the
cultures of California, Texas, Georgia, Iowa, New York, or Massachusetts are the same. The real danger of loss of culture comes from
incorporation into state government, where the American federal
arrangement left the “vast inherency” of authority to embody culture
in law.
2.

Choosing to Incorporate with the States

Tribes that see continued participation in state politics as desirable, or possibly unavoidable, might wonder why there is any practical
or ethical need for them to change the status quo. On the contrary,
both a practical and an ethical reason to affirmatively seek incorporation exist. Practically speaking, most tribes’ current course of action
will ultimately result in their incorporation into surrounding states,
but will not afford them much, if any, control over the outcome of
that incorporation. Absent affirmative tribal action, the federal
245. True abandonment of these policies would not mean non-citizen reservation
residents would have to leave the reservation. It would only mean that they would be
subject to tribal authority, just like anyone else who owns land or resides in a state or
nation of which he or she is not a citizen.
246. See Porter, The Demise, supra note 13, at 171–72 (explaining that as more
Indians become involved in the federal political process, these individuals feel like
participants within the federal political system, rather than peoples outside of the
federal political process diplomatically involved as part of a sovereign Indigenous
nation); Porter, Two Kinds of Indians, supra note 13, at 642 (expressing the belief that
the very fact that many Indians view themselves as American citizens is evidence that
such individuals are now “Native American” instead of Ongwehoweh).
247. See generally THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note184, at xli–xlii (explaining that
the Antifederalists failed to understand the Constitution proposed a government of
limited powers that would not “stamp out diversity” or “require uniformity”).
248. See supra note 190.
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government—either Congress or the courts —will likely one day
implicitly, or possibly explicitly, hollow out tribal sovereignty as the
logical conclusion of tribes’ perceived consent to non-tribal authority
by participation and the imperium in imperio problem. By not affirmatively choosing to incorporate, tribes give up bargaining position that
could be used to secure advantages of sovereignty that might not
survive incorporation otherwise.
Right now, tribes have a measure of independence that states
generally oppose. That independence represents something the
states want, or more accurately, want to eliminate. However, if tribes
continue to participate in state politics without seeking some segregation of authority, tribal independence will likely one day disappear as
a result of the state-tribal competition for sovereignty, thus dissolving
any previous bargaining advantage. Alternatively, tribes could
affirmatively seek to incorporate into the surrounding state but make
incorporation contingent on the preservation of some measure of the
advantages they enjoyed prior to incorporation. Tribes pursuing this
course would also need to make sure any such concessions could not
easily be undone post incorporation. Examples of advantages tribes
might preserve would be legalizing certain types of gaming that would
otherwise be prohibited, control of environmental standards within
the former tribal territory, preservation of hunting rights, preservation of fishing rights, and preservation of sacred sites. Tribes might
also be able to preserve access to specific federal benefits, like the
249
Indian Health Service. Tribes would likely be unable to preserve
exemptions from state taxation, but states would also assume responsibility for spending those taxes for the benefit of the former tribal
citizens and the former reservation area. Admittedly, securing these
advantages might prove politically and legally difficult. That difficulty
will need to be part of the equation in deciding whether or not to
incorporate.

249. The tribe would cease to be politically autonomous, but federal benefits are
not necessarily dependent on enrollment. See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 84–86 (1977) (holding Congress’ exclusion of group of Indians from
receiving share of distribution of tribal assets permissible where decision is “‘tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians’”);
Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 423–25 (1907) (holding that Congress can authorize
review of citizen determinations by tribal courts); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F.
Supp. 808, 813–15 (E.D. Wash. 1965), aff’d, 384 U.S. 209 (1966) (denying heirship
and benefits under statute defining tribal membership as enrolled members with a
minimum quantity of Indian blood); Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs
and the Federal Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. Pub. L. 1, 121 (2004).
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From an ethical point of view, tribes choosing not to affirmatively
seek either incorporation or separation create opportunities for
federal courts to further undermine the sovereignty of all tribes.
Cases resulting from the continued conflict between state and tribal
sovereignty affect the destiny of all tribes and could affect the
sovereignty of tribes in the process of trying to separate from state
government. Attempts to avoid litigation will to some extent limit the
chance of an adverse decision, but avoidance will not always be
possible. The possibility exists that the actions of tribes choosing to
continue participating but not incorporating will hasten the erosion
of tribal sovereignty faster than tribes making different choices can
prepare for that erosion.
3.

Choosing Some Measure of Separation

Tribes can also avoid piecemeal destruction of their sovereignty
by creating some measure of separation from state government. Two
possibilities for doing this are: (1) segregation of authority, similar to
what the Tenth Amendment does between the state and federal
governments; or (2) comprehensive sovereign separation from the
surrounding state, similar to the separation states have from each
other. The goals may be simple to point out, but it is no secret that
seeking any such separation will be difficult. Tribes have inherited a
long history of comprehensive antagonism to their independence.
Changing the trajectory of tribal sovereignty—changing the assumptions about whether tribal governments deserve the same rules and
respect that state governments do— will take similar clear, comprehensive, consistent action, just like modification of any long-standing
belief or behavior.
a.

Measure of Separation by Limiting Authority

The first option—segregating, or limiting, authority—focuses on
separating how tribal and state authority overlap in terms of subject
matter, as opposed to how they overlap in terms of person and place.
Pursuing this option would likely involve some type of negotiated
250
agreement between tribes, states, and the federal government. The
specific language, form, and process of adoption for any law segregating authority is beyond the scope of the present article, but using
some form of affirmative law seems necessary under this approach

250.

COHEN, supra note 45, at 589–94.
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given that the federal government has proven unwilling to maintain a
coherent sovereign boundary. Affirmative law would, to a large
extent, remove the placement and solidity of the tribal-state boundary
from the schizophrenia of federal Indian law jurisprudence. However, the adoption of any law changing the sovereignty or territory of a
government would certainly involve considerable political, electoral,
and procedural hurdles at all levels to say the least, hurdles that tribes
would not have complete control over—a factor weighing against
pursuit of this option. Beyond these hurdles, such agreements would
likely cut both ways. On the one hand, the agreement itself would
implicitly acknowledge the sovereignty of the tribe. On the other
hand, reaching agreement would likely require additional cessions of
251
sovereign authority, territory, or resources.
Whatever form the proposed limiting law takes, it should employ
a retained-rights paradigm, similar to how authority is divided
between the states and the federal government under the Tenth
Amendment. For instance, the agreement might read: “The powers
not delegated to the United States or the State by this agreement, nor
prohibited by it to the Tribe, are reserved to the Tribe, or to the
Tribe’s citizens.”
The idea here is to leave as little authority in the hands of the
state and federal governments as possible, leaving the “vast inherency”
to the tribe. Unfortunately, this two-tiered limitation has an inherent
flaw. Even if governing authority can be split three ways, it is an open
question how much authority will be left to the tribe.
b.

Comprehensive Separation

To pursue the second option —comprehensive political separation from the state—tribes need to take steps to sever the connections
between state government, reservation citizens, and reservation
territory. This will require action on several fronts, each focusing on
251. Some scholars have heralded intergovernmental agreements as a means to
achieve an adequate division of authority and the future of tribal-state coexistence,
borrowing from the example of the use of such agreements in the state-to-state
context. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53
FED. LAW. 38, 42–43 (2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies”
Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 82–87 (2007). Certainly such
agreements help solve discrete problems and present opportunities for cost sharing.
However, the viability of the agreements as a means of reaching broader issues of
sovereign division is questionable. See COHEN, supra note 45, at 589–94; Ezra Rosser,
Caution, Cooperative Agreements, and the Actual State of Things: A Reply to Professor Fletcher,
42 TULSA L. REV. 57, 62–73 (2006).
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ending the ways tribal and state authority overlap with regard to
person and place. The first important nexus that must be separated is
dual citizenship.
i.

Separating Tribal Citizen from State Citizen

As stated earlier, reservation citizens consent to state authority by
252
voting in state elections. By living on the reservation, they bring that
authority inside tribal territory. Unfortunately, tribes have no control
over who the surrounding state considers eligible to vote in state
elections, i.e. is a state citizen. Any effort to create civil or criminal
penalties associated with participation in state politics would likely
invite challenges under voting rights laws —misguided though they
may be —at a time when tribes are better off keeping decisions about
their sovereignty out of court. That said, tribes still retain considera253
ble discretion in determining their own citizenship. This situation
raises the possibility of disenrollment as a tool. As controversial as
such a measure would surely be, it is not without precedent.
Certain voluntary actions done with intent to renounce citizen254
ship will result in the loss of U.S. citizenship. Such actions include
becoming a citizen of another country, declaring allegiance to
another country, serving in government office of another country
when such service requires an oath of allegiance, or formally renounc255
ing allegiance to a State Department Official while abroad.
Conversely, those seeking U.S. citizenship via naturalization must
pledge “to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
whom or which the applicant was before a subject or citizen” and “to
bear true faith and allegiance to the [Constitution and the laws of the

252. See supra Part IV.A.
253. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 49 (1978)
(upholding tribal ordinance denying membership in tribe to children of female
members who married outside the tribe while extending membership to children of
male members who married outside the tribe); Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76,
95 (1906) (affirming that only such white persons as intermarried with Cherokees by
blood prior to November 1, 1875, were entitled to any share in the Cherokee
property, or to be enrolled for that purpose); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 223
(1897) (affirming the validity of Chickasaw decision to withdrawing tribal citizenship
from wife, and therefore husband); Smith v. Babbit, 100 F.3d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 1996)
(discussing sovereignty of Indian tribes in determining tribal membership).
254. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2006).
255. Id.
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United States]” Other countries have similar statutes. These acts
provide a strong indication that the individual in question has
withdrawn consent to being a citizen or has transferred allegiances.
The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that voting in a
258
foreign election does not constitute such an act, but that has not
259
always been the case and the difference between the voluntary act of
voting and the voluntary acts currently resulting in loss of citizenship
seems scant. Citizenship in a country is usually a pre-requisite to
voting in a country. Citizens of one American state who subsequently
vote in the elections of another state generally lose their citizenship in
260
the first state.
Some tribes historically had similar laws. The
Iroquois considered participation in another government’s affairs
grounds to exclude those doing so from leadership within the
261
Iroquois Confederacy.
Tribes could adopt similar rules to resolve the dual-citizenship
problem by automatically disenrolling any reservation citizen who votes
in a state election, files to run for state office, or serves in elected state
262
office.
A preemptive measure may seem severe, but any law
requiring affirmative enforcement will likely leave the vast majority of
dual citizenship cases intact, even if a tribe expends considerable

256. Id. § 1448(a) (alteration in original).
257. See, e.g., Yousef T. Jabareen, Constitution Building and Equality in Deeply-Divided
Societies: The Case of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 345, 370
n.82 (2008) (discussing the Israeli requirement of renouncing foreign citizenship);
Annelies Lottman, No Direction Home: Nationalism and Statelessness in the Baltics, 43 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 503, 506–514 (2008) (discussing the legislative schemes used to address
citizenship questions by the Baltic states upon declaring independence from the
Soviet Union); John Rockwell Snowden et al., American Indian Sovereignty and
Naturalization: It’s a Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 181–84 (2001) (discussing the
history of the U.S. citizenship laws); Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturalization, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 479, 504–08 (1999) (discussing the requirement of the
renunciation oath for citizenship in the United States and its gradual move towards
ineffectiveness).
258. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).
259. Id.
260. See ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.020(6) (2009); ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.043(3) (2009);
GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 3 §9124(f) (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-13(7) (2009); N.M.
STAT. § 1-1-7(H)(1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.02(H) (2007); OR. REV. STAT. §
247.035(e) (2009); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2814(h) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 6.10(10) (2004);
Klumker v. Van Allred, 811 P.2d 75, 79 (N.M. 1991).
261. See Chief Irving Powless, Jr., supra note 46, at 1083; Porter, The Demise, supra
note 13, at 159; George, supra note 52; Hauptman, supra note 52.
262. Tribes could enforce such laws by regularly comparing tribal citizenship
records with county voting records.
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263

resources on policing.
Reasons exist for adopting a more comprehensive law to control
dual citizenship, one that would disenroll any tribal citizen, regardless
of residence, who votes in a state election, files to run for state office,
or serves in elected state office. First, participation by off-reservation
tribal citizens implies some level of acceptance of state authority by
the tribe because all tribal citizens, regardless of residence, constitute
part of the tribe. While some may see little harm in voting by offreservation tribal citizens, consider that resident aliens in the United
States, and United State citizens abroad, generally do not vote in the
elections of the countries in which they reside. The same can be said
of U.S. citizens from one state who temporarily reside in another,
such as college students or military personnel. Second, and more
importantly, off-reservation tribal citizens who participate in tribal
elections represent an inverse corollary to reservation citizens who
participate in state elections. Specifically, off-reservation tribal
citizens who vote in tribal elections participate in making laws that
affect the reservation, and therefore not necessarily themselves or
where they live, including decisions about the allocation of government resources.
The dilemma presented by off-reservation tribal citizen voting
deepens because most agree that off-reservation citizens have some
degree of connection with their tribal homeland and allegiance to
their tribal government. Those who left the reservation generally did
so for reasons unrelated to allegiance to the tribe, or investment in its
well-being, for example school or employment. Consider a hypothetical tribe that lives “within driving distance” of a large city where many
tribal citizens have migrated. Assume the tribe has (a) a high
incidence of diabetes, (b) bad reservation roads, (c) a rundown
school building with too few teachers, and (d) a significant budget
surplus. The tribe could (1) distribute the funds as per capita
payments, (2) invest in the reservation’s roads, (3) remodel the
school, (4) hire more teachers, (5) create a language retention
program, (6) build a dialysis center on the reservation, or (7) build a
dialysis center in the nearby city. There are no objectively “right” or
“wrong” choices, but how tribal citizens respond to this situation, and
263. Given the Supreme Court’s use of participation-based reasoning to limit
tribal authority over non-citizens living on the reservations, tribes might consider ways
to allow non-citizen reservation residents to participate in reservation government in
some fashion. Unfortunately, such a discussion is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
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others like it over time, will affect the tribe’s sovereign character and
whether surrounding governments acknowledge and validate that
sovereign character.
Recognizing this problem, some tribes have responded by requiring voters to reside on the reservation or requiring in-person voting
264
on the reservation. Tribes not comfortable with completely severing
the relationship with off-reservation tribal citizens could fashion a
new, intermediate category of political relation, possibly categorized
as “members.” The exact nature of this intermediate political
relationship would depend on the individual circumstances of the
tribe in question. A full discussion of the possibilities here is beyond
the scope of the present paper, but one possible configuration would
give individuals in this category access to tribal services and benefits,
but exclude them from suffrage. This structure would have the added
265
benefit of preserving federal funding levels.
Given the severity of disenrollment, significant post-deprivation
due process protections would be appropriate. Tribes should
consider carefully the burdens of persuasion and standard of proof
involved in any post-disenrollment hearing, taking into account the
reliability of state and tribal voting records, among other factors.
Provisions might also be made to allow disenrolled individuals to reenroll on certain conditions, such as expiration of a minimum period
of disenrollment, tribal service, an oath of allegiance, or some
266
combination thereof. Tribes adopting such a law should also set its
effective date far enough in the future to allow tribal members to
267
remove their name from the state voter rolls beforehand.
The
effects of disenrollment also should be limited to the individual who
registers to vote in a non-tribal election, avoiding any impact on the
tribal citizenship of relatives or descendents.
264. See, e.g., CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE ALABAMA AND COUSHATTA TRIBES OF
TEXAS, art. V, § 1, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu./IRA.html; Oneida Tribe of
Indians of Wisconsin, ONEIDA CODE OF LAWS, ch. 2.8 § B, available at
http://www.oneidanation.org/government/lawsandpolicies/oneidacodeoflaws.aspx.
265. See Margo S. Brownell, Who Is An Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question
at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 276 (2001) (discussing
census calculations and the effect on federal funding for Native American tribes).
266. It warrants mentioning that disenrollment does not affect the culture of a
disenrolled individual, although many will surely feel that way. The inability to vote
in tribal elections will not affect disenrollees’ ability to live their lives according to
traditional customs, beliefs, and values.
267. See generally KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.0452(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2008); MD.
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-501(1) (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. Election Law § 5-400(1)g
(McKinney 2008).
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It is important that tribes only disenroll citizens who actually vote
in state elections, and allow them to register to vote with the state
without consequence. Not registering to vote in state elections would
have the additional consequence of making tribal citizens ineligible to
vote in federal elections, a collateral effect with bothersome implications that need to be avoided. States set voter qualifications, thereby
268
controlling who votes, subject to Constitutional limitations. States
do not separate qualifications for state elections from qualifications
for federal elections. Hence, anyone who does not register to vote in
state elections becomes ineligible to vote in federal elections. The
prospect of foregoing federal suffrage should give pause to pro-tribal
interests. Federal legislation, policies, and programs affect much of
reservation life, a strong argument for continued federal participa269
tion. Tribes’ political/diplomatic leverage relies in large part on
their ability to affect federal elections via reliable voting blocks.
ii. Separating Tribal Territory from State Territory
Disenrolling individuals who vote in state elections ends the
problem of dual citizenship, but disenrollees living on the reservation
could still participate in state elections while there. The same can be
said for non-tribal citizens living on the reservation, of which there are
many. These territorial aspects have to be dealt with as well, but with
different measures.
To begin, tribes need to legislatively oppose the implied annexation that arises from the establishment of state voting and legislative
268. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966).
269. Some states exercise substantial law making and enforcement powers over
reservation territories pursuant to Public Law 280, suggesting a similar argument in
favor of continued tribal participation in state political processes in such cases.
However, the powers exercised by states and the implications of participation in state
political processes differ from those in the federal context making state participation
inadvisable if the affected tribes wish to avoid further losses of sovereignty. First, in
contrast to the many tribes and tribal peoples who consented to federal citizenship,
the vast majority of tribes and tribal peoples opposed, and continue to oppose,
incorporation into the surrounding states. See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying
text. Second, precedent exists for dual citizenship with the federal sovereign.
American federalism, if fully embraced in the tribal context, would avoid sovereign
competition through limitation of federal authority, and thereby avoid erosion of the
tribal sovereignty. See supra Parts IV.B., IV.C.1. No comparable mechanism for
dividing sovereignty three ways (tribal-federal-state) presently exists. Without such a
limitation, tribal sovereignty will suffer. See supra Parts IV.A–B. Even if such a
limitation could be devised, a three-way split of authority would leave fewer matters
affecting tribal citizens and lands in tribal control.
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districts on reservation lands. To do this, tribes need to adopt laws
prohibiting the use of ballots within the reservation that include
candidates for election to state office or measures concerning the
adoption of proposed state laws. Tribes may need to seize voting
machines, ballots, and other equipment as a regulatory measure to
270
prevent votes from being cast, but need not impose criminal
penalties for activities associated with state voting within tribal
territory. Any regulatory method pursued by a tribe needs to
anticipate challenges based on existing civil rights and voting laws,
initiated or supported by any of the individuals and organizations with
vested interests in continued on-reservation state voting. Note that
ballots with only federal candidates and proposed laws should be
271
allowed.
Customizing reservation ballots to include only federal
candidates and laws would be no more difficult than the creation of
the paper ballots used in each state county. Each county’s ballots only
include those candidates and measures applying to that county.
Where states use electronic voting, this customization should be
easier.
The last, and most problematic, step in bringing equitable coherence to territorial sovereignty in the tribal context is severing the
legal connection that makes tribal authority within reservations
contingent on the ownership status of the land. Ownership and
governance have been largely separated for ages outside manorial or
272
communist states. Only in the reservation context have ownership
and governance been unified. Non-Indian interests established this
connection in an effort to rationalize an unethical annexation of
territory via tortured logic out of sync with basic American sovereign
concept. The situation arose, for the most part, as a result of the
General Allotment Act —a unilateral act designed to take land from
273
Indians and destroy tribes, a policy clearly at odds with any concept
of government by consent. Changing the law would be consistent
with a genuine abandonment of the allotment and termination
policies.
Unfortunately, this answer is also politically difficult. Non-tribal
270. Any equipment or materials seized could be returned on the promise no
further attempts would be made to establish polling places within tribal territory.
271. If tribes continue participating in federal political processes, tribes need seek
a segregation of authority between the federal and tribal governments similar to the
Tenth Amendment. See supra Parts IV.A–B., IV.C.1.
272. See generally Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country, supra note
167; Richard Monette, Imposing Communism, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 991 (2008).
273. See supra Part II.E.1.
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reservation residents in all probability would strongly oppose such a
measure because it would make them subject to a government of
274
which they could never be citizens. States would also oppose such a
law because a change in the status of these lands would have a sizeable
275
impact on ad valorem tax revenues.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether tribal participation in non-tribal politics
is a welcome wagon or Trojan horse is best answered in time-honored
law school fashion —”it depends.” Both positions are potentially
“right.” If the goal is incorporation into the non-tribal body politic,
then the efforts of native peoples to obtain non-tribal voting rights
and protect their ability to exercise those rights have been great
victories, much like the victories achieved by other disadvantaged
groups such as African Americans, women, and non-property owners.
On the other hand, if the goal is asserting and maintaining tribes’
status as separate sovereigns, then the same acts constitute grave losses
and grave dangers. The one certainty is that trying to have it both
ways is likely untenable if the Founders’ ideas about imperium in
imperio carry any real-world force. The pattern of tribes’ losses of
sovereignty, reflected throughout the body of Indian law one case at a
time, suggests that imperium in imperio is indeed to blame to some
extent.
In his decision in Harrison v. Laveen, Justice Udall wrote that “[t]o
deny the right to vote, where one is legally entitled to do so, is to do
276
violence to the principles of freedom and equality.” The inverse
also bears truth: extending the right to vote to those who reject the
basic premise that voting constitutes consent to be governed also does
violence to the principles of freedom and equality. The same can be

274. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 227, at 114–17.
275. See Press Release, Sen. Schumer, Rep. Arcuri: Local Communities, Taxpayer Must
Have Better Protections Against Land Into Trust, U.S. FED. NEWS (July 15, 2009), available
at 2009 WLNR 13408750 (“‘I have long expressed my serious reservations about the
land into trust process,’ said Senator Schumer. ‘One of my fundamental concerns is
that taking land into trust will deprive local governments of much needed revenue to
pay for schools, road maintenance, and other crucial county functions, and that the
gap will have to be made up by local taxpayers. This bill will ensure that counties are
reimbursed for any possible property tax base loss, and provide some measure of
protection against these decisions.’”); Brian Barber, Council to Vote Next Week on Arkansas River Land Measure, TULSA WORLD, July 21, 2009, available at http://www.tulsaworld
.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=298&articleid=20090721_298_0_TlasCt632255.
276. 196 P.2d 456, 459 (1949).
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said for seeking the right to vote under the same circumstances.
Participation in state politics by reservation citizens represents a
hypocritical position inconsistent with fundamental American
democratic concepts. Tribes need to recognize this conflict and take
commensurate remedial action. Commensurate action does not
mean action based on idealistic goals. Rather it is what is necessary to
counteract the situation with which tribes are faced. Commensurate
action must be determined by what will sufficiently respond to the
situation at hand, not the ease or difficulty of the action required. It
should be the starting point from which to systematically choose the
best possible course from many alternatives. Looking outside this set
of alternatives is to consider options that will not achieve the ultimate
goal being sought.
In this instance, tribes face the consequences of continued participation in federal and state elections. If consent by participation
represents a subtext to the sovereign struggle between tribes and
states, and the Founders’ fears regarding dual sovereignty have any
validity, continued participation by tribes will eventually hollow out
tribal sovereignty. The general downward trajectory of tribal sovereignty suggests these concepts are indeed at play. The progression
has largely followed the incremental pattern predicted by AntiFederalist thinkers. There have been plateaus and small victories, but
overall, tribes have lost ground.
To take commensurate action, tribes need to keep tribal, state,
and federal sovereignty from conflicting. If we assume federal
lawmaking with regard to tribes will continue regardless of reserved
treaty rights, tribes have a legitimate claim to participation in that
process. However, a limitation on federal sovereignty over tribes
needs to be established if the federal-tribal relationship is ever to
reach an equitable, sustainable equilibrium, and not result in the
asphyxiation of tribal sovereignty. On the state level, tribes can either
combine with the surrounding states to form one sovereign, or create
more separation between themselves and the surrounding states.
Tribal-state separation can be achieved via a limitation similar to the
Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, or by greater respect for
sovereign boundaries, similar to the respect given to the boundaries
between states. The present jurisdictional patchwork is confusing,
tortured, and out of line with basic sovereign concept. Consequently,
the solution must bear an opposing amount of clarity, if not ease of
execution.
One way tribes can advocate for the changes proposed by this
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article is to base their arguments on the basic tenets of sustainable,
equitable government accepted by most Americans as objective truths.
If government by consent is an objective truth, it has to be true for
everyone, including tribal peoples. Similarly, if the dangers of human
self-interest and consolidated federal power are objective truths, then
they exist everywhere, and everyone needs protection from them,
tribal and non-tribal alike.
Analogizing the conceptual tensions found in Indian law to the
struggles faced by the Founders in forming the American republic
might be one way to convince non-tribal people of the need for
uniform application of these concepts. If non-tribal people can be
convinced of this analogy, they would have to concede that the
present state of affairs utterly fails to meet the “government by
consent of the governed” ideal, and embodies the polar opposite of
the limited federal power contemplated by the Tenth Amendment.
Unless non-tribal peoples are ready to assert that the Founders’
concerns about government by consent, imperium in imperio, and the
need for the Tenth Amendment were completely without merit, it
would seem that they have to concede the need to establish a limit on
federal and state authority in the tribal context, and give tribal people
increased autonomy.
Some will respond to this article by arguing that the benefits of
participation in state and national politics show the need for continued participation. Unfortunately, this approach only suggests which
choice tribes should make, not whether a choice needs to be made.
Others will say the analysis this article offers fails to acknowledge “the
actual state of things;” however, that is a matter of perspective. It is
axiomatic that tribes and tribal citizens need to make the best of what
they have and not strive for unrealistic goals. That said, tribes and
tribal citizens still need to be aware of the broader implications of the
choices they make within that caveat and strive for meaningful goals.
Just as nature abhors a vacuum, the law and society abhor hypocrisy
and inconsistency. The gravity of coherent doctrine prevails over time
versus the political exigencies or opportunities of the day. Societal,
political, and legal pressures created by policies inconsistent with
fundamental concepts are eventually resolved by reconciling the
inconsistencies.
Tribes need to take control of how the tension between tribal
participation in non-tribal politics and the fundamental American
concepts herein discussed will eventually resolve. In the past, nontribal interests have blithely abandoned fundamental tenets of
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American governmental philosophy and law when it comes to tribal
peoples. Things that would be unthinkable in non-tribal contexts
somehow become acceptable, if not clearly appropriate. Somehow,
“consent of the governed” just does not matter when it comes to
making native people citizens, acquiring tribal lands, or allowing
states to collect tax revenues outside state borders. Now, if it takes
more effort to rationalize abandoning closely held tenets than to
abide by them, non-tribal interests will certainly start embracing the
concept of consent by participation in the tribal context more fully
when they realize it can be used to eliminate what they perceive as the
inconvenience of tribal sovereignty.
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